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I. INTRODUCTION
The volume of family law litigation and legislation has contin-
ued to increase in spite of the enactment of a "no-fault" dissolution
of marriage procedure; however, the emphasis has shifted from fault
to the financial affairs of the parties with alimony, child support
and property cases apparently accounting for most of the increase
in the cases. Although no empirical study has been made by the
author, it would appear that many trial courts have demonstrated
a lack of proper discretion in applying the rehabilitative alimony
concept to women whose advanced years, physical deterioration and
general lack of employable skills preclude any realistic hope of reha-
bilitation. The pendulum may have swung too far from a former




A marriage ceremony performed by an Orthodox Jewish rabbi
in accordance with the rules and traditions of the Orthodox Jewish
faith, but which is performed without a marriage license as required
by chapter 714 of the Florida Statutes, is invalid.'
The former public policy of Florida supposedly favored a com-
mon law marriage when parties were married, became divorced and
then resumed living together prior to the adoption of section 741.211
of the Florida Statutes which did away with the common-law mar-
riage doctrine in Florida. It is not necessary to introduce testimony
of witnesses who were present when the contract of marriage be-
tween the parties was made; the marriage may be proven by testi-
mony of habit and repute in the community.'
III. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that Florida has a com-
pelling state interest in requiring six months residence as a precon-
dition to dissolution of marriage in order that Florida may avoid
intrusion upon the rights and interests of sister states and to insure
the integrity of its decrees as against future collateral attack in
foreign courts. As a result, this residency requirement is not an
unconstitutional infringement of the protected right to travel under
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.' Flor-
ida's ruling is consistent with a subsequent ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States which held that Iowa's statute requiring
one year residency for divorce neither unconstitutionally interferes
with a person's right to travel nor violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.4
At least one district court of appeal is of the view that a wife
in Florida may acquire a domicile different from that of her husband
prior to the separation of the parties so long as she has physically
resided in this state. As a result, when the parties move to Florida
the wife may adopt Florida as her domicile while the husband may
consider his domicile to continue in a foreign state even though he
is in Florida temporarily as a military serviceman. Furthermore, so
1. Litzky v. Ullman, 296 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
2. Carter v. Carter, 309 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
3. Caizza v. Caizza, 291 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1974) upholding FLA. STAT. § 61.021 (1974).
4. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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long as the wife has resided in Florida for the requisite six month
period, Florida has jurisdiction over her dissolution action even
though she may have testified that she had not decided that she
would permanently reside in Florida and that she would probably
leave Florida after the dissolution of the marriage.5
Florida's residency requirement has been met when it is shown
that a military serviceman moved to Florida with his parents when
he was 4 years old; that he never resided out of Florida except during
military service; that he frequently visited Florida while on fur-
lough; that he had listed Florida as his place of residence with the
Army and he testified that he always intended that his permanent
residence be in Florida.'
The fact of the plaintiff's residence for a dissolution of marriage
must be corroborated, and the admission by the adverse party of the
fact of residence is not sufficient.7
When testimony shows that the husband could have found his
wife's address by writing to one of his four children or to his own
brother or sister, but instead used a ten year old address, and he
admitted at the trial that he had not made any search or inquiry to
discover if the address contained in his affidavit for constructive
service was correct, his affidavit was held to be false "in that, not
only did he not make a diligent search, he made no search."' Since
the court lacked jurisdiction, the dissolution judgment was set
aside.
This holding should be compared with the one in The First
National Bank of Clearwater v. Bourquin9 wherein the notice to
appear had been mailed to the last known address of the wife and
it was returned through apparent error of the postal service. The
husband attempted to communicate with the wife's brother, her
father and her daughter in an attempt to ascertain her current ad-
dress. The court held that the husband had made an honest effort
to determine the wife's address and that he was not required to
make extraordinary efforts or to utilize all possible means in order
to satisfy the diligent search and inquiry test.
If the circuit court in Palm Beach County should transfer a
dissolution of marriage case to Collier County on the basis that
5. Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
6. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 286 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
7. Wise v. Wise, 310 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
8. Canzoniero v. Canzoniero, 305 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
9. 310 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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venue was in the latter county, the Palm Beach court may not, in
the same order, reserve jurisdiction over the wife in contempt pro-
ceedings previously instituted by the husband."°
In actions for dissolution or annulment of marriages, adoption,
and cases not requiring personal service of process, it is now permis-
sible for insolvent and poverty-stricken plaintiffs to post notice of
process instead of publication of process in a legal newspaper."
If a foreign corporation is not a party to a dissolution proceed-
ing, a court does not have the power to control (by the injunctive
process) the activities of this corporation or its president even
though he is a defendant in his personal capacity in the action. The
court has the power to control the defendant in his individual capac-
ity, but not in his official capacity. 2
The residency requirements for a dissolution of marriage may
not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of the peti-
tioner. 3
B. "Irretrievably Broken Marriages"
If the pleadings and evidence show that the marriage is "in fact
ended because of the basic unsuitability of the spouses for each
other and their state of mind toward their relationship"' 4 it is error
for the trial court to deny the dissolution and to attempt to effec-
tuate a reconciliation of the parties.
A failure to contest an allegation that the marriage is irretrieva-
bly broken or a stipulation that it is so broken is not legally
sufficient to justify a dissolution of the marriage. The trial court
judge must make a finding upon the evidence which must show
sufficient facts to justify a determination that the marriage is irre-
trievably broken, and if it is so found he must dissolve the mar-
riage. 1
A stipulation by the parties that their marriage is "irretrievably
broken" is not a sufficient predicate upon which to base a judgment
of dissolution, but rather the trial court must
[hiold a full evidentiary hearing at which all of the surrounding
facts and circumstances are to be inquired into so that the chan-
10. Kern v. Kern, 309 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
11. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-152, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 49.031, 49.10 & 49.12.
12. Donner v. Donner, 313 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
13. Lemon v. Lemon, 314 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
14. Carrigan v. Carrigan, 283 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
15. Nelms v. Nelms, 285 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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cellor properly may arrive at a conclusion as to whether or not the
marriage has reached the terminal stage based upon facts which
must be shown."0
In a case of apparent first impression in the United States, a
Florida district court has held that the parties to a dissolution of
marriage proceeding are not entitled to exclude the public and the
press merely because they request a closed hearing. Further, the
press and the public have standing to maintain a prohibition pro-
ceeding for the purpose of gaining access to such a dissolution pro-
ceeding. The court was careful to articulate that it does have power
to exclude the public for cogent reasons, but that the mere desire
of the parties for secrecy was not enough. 7
C. Defenses
The clean hands doctrine has been abolished in dissolution of
marriage proceedings except for cases involving fraud and deceit;"
therefore, it is reversible error for a trial court judge to refuse disso-
lution upon the basis that the complaining party has unclean
hands. '
D. Reservation of Jurisdiction and Nunc Pro Tunc Orders
A trial court may properly enter an order of dissolution of mar-
riage while reserving jurisdiction to determine issues regarding ali-
mony, child custody and support at a later time pending further
investigation; the court thus is not bound to decide all issues at
once.2
A trial court judge who enters a "partial final judgment of
dissolution of marriage"'" and thereafter orally advises the attorneys
of his final decision regarding all matters related thereto and asks
them to prepare a final judgment may enter two nunc pro tunc
judgments when the husband dies after the entering of the partial
final judgment of dissolution but before the entry of the final judg-
ment. The partial final judgment dissolved the marriage - not the
death of the husband.
16. Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
17. State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
18. De La Portilla v. De La Portilla, 287 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 304 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1974).
19. Johnson v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
20. Klarish v. Klarish, 296 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
21. Becker v. King, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
[Vol. XXX
FAMILY LA W
The nunc pro tunc vis-a-vis death concept made another ap-
pearance in Baggett v. Baggett.2 A judgment of dissolution of mar-
riage having been entered, the wife petitioned for a rehearing con-
cerning alimony, etc., but she did not contest the entry of the disso-
lution judgment itself. The judge, upon rehearing, orally stated that
the former husband should convey his interest in the marital home
to the former wife as alimony. Later that same day and before the
signing and entry of the written order, the former husband died. The
former wife then asked the court to enter a nunc pro tunc order
concerning the marital home, but the new wife of the former hus-
band naturally contested this approach. The appellate court held
that the trial court had the power to enter a nunc pro tunc order
since the former husband fully participated in the hearing and the
matter was ripe for determination.
E. Appeals
A trial court does not have jurisdiction to dispose of a
dissolution of marriage case when an appeal has been properly per-
fected even though no supersedeas has been taken.
23
A court may dismiss an appeal if the appellant has removed
himself from the state and has failed to comply with orders of the
trial court; however, if the removal may have been caused by a
change in employment (college teaching) rather than an attempt to
defeat jurisdiction, the court will defer the dismissal for a set period
in order to permit the appellant to return to Florida or to state under
oath that he will return within a reasonable period of time prior to
oral argument of the appeal."
F. Collateral Attack
Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a final judgment may be set aside because of "mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise or excusable neglect"; however, a mistake of law
is not grounds for setting aside a judgment. In Kuykendal v.
Kuykendal5 a proposed final decree of dissolution of marriage pro-
vided that an estate by the entirety in a fishing camp would become
a tenancy in common. The attorney for the husband agreed to this
22. 309 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
23. De La Portilla v. De La Portilla, 304 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1974).
24. Salamon v. Salamon, 306 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
25. 301 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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wording, and the judgment was signed by the trial judge. Subse-
quently, the former husband asked for the judgment to be set aside
on the grounds that he never intended for the fishing camp to be
held as a tenancy in common; that he had paid for it out of his own
funds and he did not realize until after the judgment that he would
not have an opportunity at a later time to present evidence as to his
ownership. The trial court set aside the judgment, but the District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed on the grounds that the
former husband had every opportunity prior to the entry of the
judgment to ascertain the law of Florida regarding the distribution
of real property upon dissolution of a marriage.
When a former husband files a motion under Rule 1.540
F.R.C.P. to set aside his wife's divorce on the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction because she was a resident of Mexico rather than
Florida and she does not directly attack the motion, she may not
indirectly attack it by objecting to written requests for admissions
dealing with her alleged residency in Mexico. These requests for
admissions were duly related and relevant to his claim."
If a former wife has her marriage to another annulled and then
seeks to re-establish alimony from the first husband, he may collat-
erally attack the annulment in an effort to show that she is still
married to the other "husband.""1
Under Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure a
trial court should set aside a default and final judgment which are
entered against a wife as a result of misrepresentations made to her
by her husband which caused her not to contest the dissolution
proceedings."
The declaratory judgment procedure (as provided for in chapter
86 of the Florida Statutes) may not be used to determine the valid-
ity of a divorce judgment of a Florida court which was subsequently
held to be invalid by a Massachusetts court.
G. Foreign Judgments
When a foreign court reserves jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of a divorce action, the court has continuing in
personam jurisdiction to modify the decree as to matters within the
scope of the original decree. The foreign court, however, does not
26. Polonsky v. Polonsky, 303 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
27. Gobelman v. Gobelman, 303 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
28. Kern v. Kern, 291 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
29. Thomas v. Thomas, 314 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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have jurisdiction to order a former husband to pay $5,000 to repair
the marital home in the foreign state when the original decree was
silent as to any question regarding repair and maintenance of the
home. As a result, this foreign decree would not be entitled to full
faith and credit in Florida. Similarly, when the same decree orders
the former husband to deposit $15,000 in a bank trust account to
pay for alimony, etc., this does not relate to the payment of arrear-
ages but to payment of future alimony and, since alimony may
always be modified, neither is it entitled to full faith and credit in
Florida.30
H. Legislation
The Florida Task Force on Marriage and the Family Unit was
created and authorized by the legislature to study and to make
recommendations dealing with the dissolution of marriage laws,
child custody, child support, distribution of property between
spouses, the laws relating to marriage, the causes of divorce, family
discipline of children, etc. The magnificent sum of $5,000 was ap-
propriated for the Task Force.'
IV. ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction
When a wife has changed her domicile from Wyoming to Flor-
ida prior to the filing of a divorce suit by her husband in Wyoming,
constructive service of process will not give the Wyoming court juris-
diction to adjudicate alimony and property rights. The Wyoming
decree is not entitled to full faith and credit except insofar as it
dissolves the marriage."
Constructive service of process under section 48.193(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes against a nonresident husband in a suit asking for
alimony, child support, attorney fees and costs is appropriate only
when the husband has been a resident of Florida and is now a
resident of another state or is a resident of Florida residing in a
foreign state; in the absence of one of these requirements the service
is void.33
In a dissolution action, a trial court judge is not required as a
30. West v. West, 301 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
31. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-164.
32. Storer v. Storer, 305 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
33. Rosen v. Rosen. 306 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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matter of law to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future,
and when a wife fails to appeal from a final judgment which does
not reserve jurisdiction, the judgment becomes final. The trial court
does not have jurisdiction to award alimony at a later date. 4 On the
other hand, another court has held that a trial court should reserve
jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future, in addition to
a present award of lump-sum alimony payable in monthly install-
ments when the effect of the lump-sum alimony award will leave the
wife at age fifty without any support. 5 In a questionable decision,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that a trial court
which fails to reserve jurisdiction in a dissolution judgment award-
ing rehabilitative alimony still has jurisdiction to change the re-
habilitative alimony into permanent alimony, provided that the
wife files her petition asking for this relief before the expiration of
the period set for payment of rehabilitative alimony and provided
further she shows that she has been unable to rehabilitate herself
through no fault of her own.3
The Uniform Enforcement of Support Act (chapter 88 of the
Florida Statutes) is designed to provide a remedy entirely separate
from other legal remedies. Hence, when a wife filed suit for support
under this Act, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the case on
the basis that her husband had a dissolution of marriage case pend-
ing and it would be in the best interests of the parties to have all
questions decided in the dissolution action.
B. Discovery
It has been held that a trial court judge has the discretion to
order the spouses to exchange copies of the first page of their federal
income tax returns as part of the discovery process. It is reversible
error in a dissolution of marriage action for a trial court to refuse to
require a husband to answer questions in a deposition dealing with
his alleged adultery, because the husband's conduct could be a fac-
tor in influencing the court's award of alimony to the wife under
section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes. Although a trial court judge
34. Elkins v. Elkins, 287 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
35. Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975). Even though a court may be
correct in denying alimony to a wife, the court should reserve jurisdiction in order to award
alimony in the future because of a change of conditions. Weinman v. Weinman, 310 So. 2d
442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
36. Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
37. Wagner v. Wagner, 291 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
38. Rogers v. Rogers, 297 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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may refuse to consider the husband's adultery as affecting the
award of alimony, he has no right to refuse to hear evidence dealing
with the adultery." On the other hand, it has been held in another
district that a court is not bound to hear testimony concerning the
husband's adultery when he is not claiming alimony; when the wife
is claiming alimony, the award must be based upon her needs and
the husband's ability to pay and his adultery would have no bearing
on these issues.'"
It has also been held to be improper for a new trial court judge
to make his determination of a new alimony award based upon an
appellate record submitted upon a prior appeal of the case, and the
case must be remanded for the taking of additional testimony.'
C. Criteria for the Award
Section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that "in deter-
mining a proper award of alimony, the court may consider any
factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." The
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that the marital
conduct and misconduct of the parties is a factor to be considered
by the trial court in awarding alimony and attorney's fees, and that
the case law which developed under former section 61.08 "is equally
applicable to the 1971 statute."42
Moreover, it is an abuse of discretion and reversible error for a
chancellor to refuse to give a husband an opportunity to allege the
adultery of the wife and to allow a hearing on this matter as a
defense to the awarding of alimony and the amount thereof. The
trial court may, however, after hearing evidence on the issue of
adultery, choose to consider or exclude it in making the award.43 It
is to be wondered if this required hearing may well be arid formal-
ism.
If a husband and wife each have substantially the same income,
it is reversible error to award alimony to the wife.44
Section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that the court
may consider any factor in making an alimony award; therefore, it
is not improper for a court to consider the fact that the husband was
39. Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
40. Escobar v. Escobar, 300 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
41. Dash v. Dash, 306 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
42. Oliver v. Oliver, 285 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
43. Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
44. Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396, (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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guilty of overreaching in a real estate transaction with his wife. 5
It would appear that even though a husband has submitted
financial statements to banks in order to secure credit and his wife
later uses these statements against him in dissolution proceedings,
he may nonetheless show that "99% of the. . . financial statements
indicate 'puffing' "" in order to show his true worth and income.
There would seem to be a questionable moral standard implicit in
this decision.
It is reversible error for a trial court to dismiss a wife's claim
for alimony on the ground that she had initially refused to submit
to a physical examination by a doctor to determine the validity of
her assertion that she was unable to work when she subsequently
agreed to submit to an examination. This particular sanction was
excessive and it should not have gone beyond the point of barring
her from introducing evidence that she was unable to work; the
sanction should not be continued beyond that point when the wife
agreed to submit to an examination.47
An award of alimony consisting of 30 per cent of the husband's
gross income has been held to be improper when the husband's
income has been relatively modest during his specialized medical
training and the couple's standard of living was much higher than
his income because of support furnished by the wife's parents. The
alimony should have been based upon the standard of living which
they could have maintained without contribution from the wife's
parents."
D. Duration of an Award
A court should specify whether alimony is either permanent or
rehabilitative as well as whether a husband's obligation to pay
mortgage payments (as required in the judgment) is either alimony
or child support."
The question of the duration of an award of alimony has been
dramatically affected by the case of First National Bank of St.
Petersburg v. Ford.' " In Ford a trial court judge awarded alimony
to the wife "for the rest of her life or until she remarries."' , This
45. Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
46. Neckman v. Neckman, 298 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
47. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
48. Bob v. Bob, 310 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
49. Moore v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
50. 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973).
51. Id. at 343.
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judgment was not based upon a separation agreement. The husband
did not appeal from the award and complied with it for approxi-
mately four years prior to his death. The Supreme Court of Florida
cited the case of Aldrich v. Aldrich 2 for the rule that although a trial
court may not have power to award alimony as a charge against the
estate of a husband during the lifetime of the wife, if the husband
should fail to appeal from such an award and comply with it he has,
in effect, consented to it. The award therefore would not be subject
to collateral attack after his death and would be a charge against
his estate. The court, however, chose to modify the effect of Aldrich
by holding that pursuant to sections 61.14 and 61.08 of the Florida
Statutes, the personal representative of the estate of the deceased
husband may apply to the trial court which may re-examine the
award and grant a lump-sum award in order to avoid delaying the
closing of the estate. The trial court judge should consider the pres-
ent worth of the wife based on her life expectancy, the probability
of remarriage, her separate estate, her prospects for employment,
health, etc., in determining the amount of the lump-sum award.
Subsequent to the Ford case, one district court of appeal has held
that a court has no authority to order, in a dissolution judgment,
that alimony should continue after the death of the husband even
though the wife is permanently disabled and mentally incompe-
tent.53 Nevertheless, another district court of appeal has held that
in appropriate circumstances (such as advanced age and poor health
of the wife) a court may order that alimony and child support should
continue beyond the death of the husband and that if he should
predecease her, this alimony shall become a lien against his residen-
tial property. Further, the court may enjoin the sale of the property
until further order of the court so as to effectuate the alimony and
child support provisions." It is fascinating to note that both courts
cited Ford as authority for their inconsistent views.
A trial court should award "permanent" alimony to a mother
of four minor children when the facts show that she is fulfilling the
role of a mother; however, "permanent" alimony is not necessarily
to be considered as an award forever because when the children have
become adults it may well be appropriate for a modification of the
award to be made. 5
52. 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1964).
53. Bunn v. Bunn, 311 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), following Aldrich v. Aldrich, and
distinguishing First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973).
54. Rouse v. Rouse, 313 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
55. Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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E. Life Insurance and Alimony
Alimony normally ceases upon the death of the former husband
and, therefore it is reversible error for a trial court in marriage
dissolution proceedings to order a husband to obtain a life insurance
policy on his life with his wife as the beneficiary."
F. Rehabilitative Alimony
It would appear to be reversible error to award rehabilitative
alimony without providing for a specific termination date in the
order.57 Furthermore, if a wife has acquired a large separate estate,
then no rehabilitation process is necessary or contemplated and it
is error to award rehabilitative alimony."
If a wife "is a trained physical therapist and will not require
retraining or further education to pursue her chosen field," 9 she is
not entitled to any rehabilitative alimony even though she testified
that "she was experiencing some difficulty in finding employment
because of the current economic recession." ' "
It has been held to be reversible error for a trial court to award
alimony for three years as rehabilitative alimony when the wife was
55 years old, had never worked, had poor health and failing vision,
the marriage was of 13 years duration with a high standard of living
and the husband had substantial sources of income. Permanent
alimony either in lump-sum or in installments should have been
awarded." It has also been held to be reversible error for a trial court
to award rehabilative alimony to a wife aged 56 for a period of only
5 years, when the facts show that she had not worked since 1945,
there was no evidence that she was employable and there was no
evidence that she would in fact be rehabilitated when she was 61
years old."2
In reversing an award of rehabilitative alimony and ordering
the trial court to award permanent alimony, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, has said that when the wife is 44 and the
husband 47, the husband earns $29,000 per year while the wife is
unemployed with only a high school education and no skills, and it
56. Faidley v. Faidley, 298 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
57. Zilbert v. Zilbert, 287 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 305
So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (per curiam).
58. Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
59. Sisson v. Sisson, 311 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
60. Id. at 801.
61. Dash v, Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
62. Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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is unlikely that she will be able to secure employment paying more
than one quarter of what her husband earns, it is only proper that
the husband be required to give her support on a permanent basis
"subject always to the right of obtaining relief under changed cir-
cumstances."63
It is also reversible error to award rehabilitative alimony to a
wife who has no business experience or training, has never been
employed except for some part-time modeling 15 years prior to the
dissolution action, whose health is not good and who must take care
of very young children. The former wife is entitled to permanent
alimony 64
An award of rehabilitative alimony for a period of 2 years is
improper when the wife (who has a ninth grade education) will be
58 years old when the payments terminate, will have dismal em-
ployment prospects as a receptionist because of age, and her physi-
cian-husband is well able to furnish adequate support."5
In considering whether to award permanent alimony or rehabil-
itative alimony under section 61.08(1) of the Florida Statutes, a trial
court may consider as a factor inducing the award of permanent
rather than rehabilitative alimony, that the wife, upon resigning her
employment at the insistence of her husband during the marriage,
suffered a loss of senority with her employer.66
When the spouses are both medical doctors and the wife can
earn more than $30,000 per year, it is error to award her permanent
alimony and she is at best entitled to no more than rehabilitative
alimony for a short period of time to enable her to adjust to her new
circumstances.67
Although it may be correct for a trial court to award rehabilita-
tive alimony for a limited period of 1 year, it may be reversible error
for the trial court to limit the former husband's duty to make mort-
gage payments and to pay taxes and insurance on the marital home
for only 1 year when the home is to be used for the former wife and
their children. The latter duty should continue until the wife's right
to possession of the house for her use and the use of the children
should terminate.6 8
An appellate court may hold that an award of permanent ali-
63. Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
64. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 310 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
65. Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th Dist 1975).
66. Brook v. Brook, 289 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
67. Peck v. Peck, 291 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
68. Baker v. Baker, 291 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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mony is excessive in light of the needs of the wife and the ability of
the husband to pay, but the court may then decide not to disturb
the order and to consider it as rehabilitative alimony limited to a
period of 2 years from the date of the issuance of the mandate of
the court.6 9
An award of alimony which provides that it is to run until
further order of the court and that the court retains jurisdiction over
the parties may be affirmed on appeal despite the protests of the
husband that since he was to retire in 5 years the award should have
been a rehabilitative one. The award, however, no matter what it is
labeled, may be modified upon a change of circumstances.'
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has affirmed an
award of rehabilitative alimony to a wife in the amount of $1,750
per month for 5 years when the wife was undergoing psychiatric
treatment, was a medical school student and her physician-husband
was earning approximately $133,000 per year.7
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, apparently has
held that when a wife, age 36, was married at age 19, has had
neither extensive schooling nor training, has had no experience in
supporting herself, and her only employment was for 2 weeks as a
receptionist, "there is nothing to which the wife can be rehabili-
tated."72 The court reversed the award of rehabilitative alimony
and made the award permanent. "If, after some period of time, she
should acquire or become possessed of the ability to support her-
self to an extent which should relieve the husband of his obligation
in that respect in whole or in part, that would constitute a change
of circumstances for Which the husband might seek relief from con-
tinued payment of alimony."73 This opinion would seem to have
the effect of not obligating the wife to make any effort to rehabili-
tate herself by acquiring any training or education. If this analysis
is correct, then the rehabilitative section of the Dissolution of
Marriage Act would appear to have been judicially repealed.
On the other hand, the District Court of Appeal, First District,
has seemed to indicate that a former wife does have an affirmative
obligation to become rehabilitated or the obligation for continued
alimony by the husband will be terminated.74
69. Tierney v. Tierney, 290 So.2d 136 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
70. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 293 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
71. Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
72. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
73. Id.
74. Kessinger v. Kessinger, 297 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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The District Court of Appeal, First District, has frowned upon
a trial court's termination of permanent alimony 2 year after the
order in modification proceedings when the original alimony award
was based upon a stipulation and there had not been any change in
the circumstances of the parties. The appellate court extended the
phase-out period to 3 years which would give the former wife "ample
time to prepare herself for making a living."75
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to award rehabil-
itative alimony as compared to permanent alimony to a wife whose
children are adults when she is a registered nurse and has a modest
savings account and while the husband is a clerk earning approxi-
mately $757.00 per month, even though the parties were married for
25 years and the wife had not worked since 1970.71
A trial court should (under pain of being reversed) reserve juris-
diction to award permanent alimony (in the event of a subsequent
change of circumstances) when it awards rehabilitative alimony.77
A final dissolution of marriage judgment which provides for
"temporary rehabilitative alimony"" for a period of 6 months may
be modified under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes because
there is no difference between "temporary rehabilitative alimony"
and "rehabilitative alimony."
A divorce judgment recited that "the court awards as rehabili-
tative alimony to be paid by the Respondent-Husband to the
Petitioner-Wife the lump-sum alimony of Thirty Thousand .. .
Dollars to be paid on the basis of One Thousand . . .Dollars per
month for the next thirty months . . . . " Before the monthly
payments were completed the wife remarried, and her new husband
had sufficient means to support her. The former husband brought
suit to eliminate the monthly payments on the ground that the
wife's new marriage terminated her need for rehabilitative alimony.
In stating that the intent of the original judgment was to give the
wife lump-sum alimony payable in monthly installments for the
benefit of the former husband, the trial court refused to terminate
the payments. Upon appeal it was held that the alimony was de-
nominated as "rehabilitative" in the original judgment and that the
former wife was not entitled to payments subsequent to her new
marriage.
75. Protheroe v. Protheroe, 300 So. 2d 748, 749 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
76. Fesak v. Fesak, 303 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
77. Nichols v. Nichols, 304 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
78. Cantor v. Cantor, 306 So. 2d 596, 597 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
79. Blackmon v. Blackmon, 307 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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G. Lump-Sum Alimony
The Supreme Court of Florida has reversed the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, which had affirmed a trial court award
of lump-sum alimony of $7,200 to a wife from a husband who had a
net worth in excess of $3,000,000 and a yearly income of over
$90,000. The parties had been married for 7 years and had one child;
the wife was working as a grocery store check-out girl at the time of
the marriage and did not have a high school education. It seems
clear that the court was of the view that the husband would be liable
for permanent alimony in an amount which would allow the wife to
maintain the same living style as during the marriage."0
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has upheld (in
a split opinion) a lower court award to the wife of life insurance
policies owned by the husband on his own life as a part of a lump-
sum alimony. It would seem that this could be construed as an
alimony award payable after the death of the husband.8
A cash award as lump-sum alimony and an additional lump-
sum alimony award of the husband's interest in the former marital
residence of the parties, although unusual, may be justified by the
fact that he has absented himself from the state and has been in
contempt of the court for failure to pay temporary alimony.82
A wife who is a very successful "wheeler-dealer" and worth
more than a quarter of a million dollars is not entitled to lump-sum
alimony, periodic alimony or the maintenance of life insurance by
her husband even though he earns more than the wife and is much
more wealthy than she.
8 3
A wife is not entitled to lump-sum alimony and attorney's fees
when neither party is able to work (because of advanced age) and
her special equity interest in property owned by the husband equals
(if not exceeds) his in value. 4
Likewise, if the wife has a separate estate which is larger than
that of her husband and she receives "a passive income" from this
property which is sufficient to support her without the necessity of
working, she is not entitled to lump-sum or any kind of alimony. 5
A judgment compelling the payment of lump-sum alimony is a
80. Keller v. Keller, 308 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1974), rev'g 287 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
81. Harrison v. Harrison, 284 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
82. Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 300 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
83. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1974).
84. Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
85. White v. White, 314 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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money judgment within the meaning of Rule 5.7, Florida Appellate
Rules, which provides that a supersedeas bond should be in an
amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment together with other enu-
merated items."
It is proper to award the marital residence to the wife as lump-
sum rehabilitative alimony when she is disabled as the result of
being shot by her husband and she is on welfare. 7
H. Enforcement of the Award
A contempt order for a former husband's failure to pay alimony
must provide that he has the "unequivocal right" to purge himself
of this contempt by complying with the terms of the order.
A former husband who has been ordered to pay alimony may
not evade this order by refusing to practice his profession of medi-
cine. 9
A trial court may not hold a former husband in contempt for
failure to pay alimony until his perfected interlocutory appeal con-
testing jurisdiction is determined. Further, the court may not order
him to make payments and then prospectively direct the sheriff to
take him into custody for contempt of court if he fails to make the
payments. Due process requires that the former husband be af-
forded an opportunity to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt."
A court does not have the power to hold a former husband in
contempt for his failure to pay a money judgment for accrued ali-
mony because this would be imprisonment for a debt. The wife's
action in reducing accrued unpaid alimony payments to a judgment
takes away her ability to use the contempt process to collect the
arrearages.9 '
The failure of a former wife to request her former husband to
pay support payments to her for a period of 8 years does not give
rise to the defense of laches when the former husband is unable to
prove a change of a position in reliance on any understanding or
assumption that she would not attempt to collect this support. Fur-
ther, since the moneys in question were for the support of the former
wife and a daughter, and the former husband had contributed to the
86. Knipe v. Knipe, 290 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
87. Barrett v. Barrett, 305 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
88. Newton v. Newton, 287 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
89. Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
90. Strauser v. Strauser, 303 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
91. Clark v. Muldrew, 308 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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support of this daughter during the 8 year period, he would be
entitled to a credit for these payments.2
Notice to a former spouse of a hearing upon a motion for an
order of contempt may be sent by mail; a contempt hearing notice
does not require service by the sheriff. 3
I. Modification of Alimony
A fundamental change in the circumstances of the parties is an
absolute prerequisite in proceedings for modification of support.
In determining the modification of alimony a court should con-
sider the former husband's assets as well as his current income and
the fact that although his income has been substantially reduced,
it may be the result of a voluntary act by him with the intent to
reduce his alimony obligations. 5
It is reversible error to reduce an alimony and child support
award on the basis that the former husband's net weekly income has
been reduced when his gross income has remained the same and he
has not explained the reasons for the alleged reduction in his net
income. Further, the trial court should not have considered the
petition for modification while the former husband was in default
in paying accrued amounts and there was no proof that he was
unable to pay the defaulted amounts.
Inasmuch as unpaid support payments constitute a vested
property right, a court has no power to modify them retroactively. 7
A final divorce judgment awarded the wife and children use of
the family home until it was disposed of by partition or other process
and also awarded alimony and child support to the wife. The judg-
ment simply allowed partition but did not foresee that the husband
would seek partition soon after the divorce. As a result, if the wife
and children are forced to leave the home because of the former
husband's partition suit, the wife is entitled to an increased award
of alimony and child support because this would be a change in the
financial circumstances of the wife.99
When there is an indication of a conspiracy between a woman's
first husband and her second husband such that the second husband
92. Jimenez v. Jimenez, 309 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
93. Spencer v. Spencer, 311 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
94. Young v. Young, 290 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
95. Gamse v. Gamse, 291 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
96. Feder v. Feder, 291 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
97. Smith v. Smith, 293 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
98. Neel v. Neel, 298 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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is to marry and then divorce her in order for the second marriage to
terminate the right to alimony under the first marriage and there is
no proof that the second marriage is irretrievably broken, the trial
court should continue jurisdiction over the matter in order to direct
the parties to attempt reconciliation. If reconciliation proves unsuc-
cessful and if a conspiracy is shown to exist, then the trial court
should award alimony to be paid by the second husband in the same
amount that the wife lost from the first as a result of the second
marriage ."
If the former wife's income has substantially increased over the
years since a divorce while the former husband's income has re-
mained substantially the same, it may be an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to reduce the amount of alimony payments (at the
request of the former husband) without fixing a termination date for
the payment of all future alimony.'"
A trial court judge is not justified in refusing to modify an
alimony award even though the former husband, in response to a
question from the judge as to what amount he would be willing to
pay, replied that no alimony was justified and that he would not pay
any further alimony. The amount of alimony must be fixed based
on the former wife's needs and the former husband's ability to
pay.
101
Moreover, it is reversible error for a trial court to reduce the
amount of periodic alimony awarded by a foreign decree when the
former wife's needs have increased and the former husband's ability
to pay has also increased. It is also error to refuse to enter judgment
against the former husband for arrearages accrued under the foreign
judgment and to order that he pay it at the rate of $100 per month,
when the only reason for doing so was that he might have to dispose
of some of his assets in order to pay the accrued sum of $7,290.102
It is also reversible error for a trial court to eliminate the former
husband's obligation to pay alimony (under a prior award) when he
simply asked the court to reduce the amount of alimony because of
a change in his circumstances." 3
A retired former husband who secures temporary employment
which increases his income may be forced to pay increased alimony
99. Little v. Little, 298 So. 2d 474 (Fla. lt Dist. 1974).
100. Craig v. Craig, 298 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
101. Tarr v. Tarr, 299 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
102. Friedly v. Friedly, 303 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
103. Herbert v. Herbert, 304 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
19751
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
on the basis that "[wihile the increase in earnings above that an-
ticipated at the time of the entry of the order of modification after
the husband retired may be temporary, it does indicate a change in
circumstances to the extent that it shows the former husband had
an ability to earn if he so desired." 104
When an order of modification of judgment of dissolution which
reduces the husband's alimony payments is appealed by the wife
without stay and it is reversed on appeal without any direction from
the appellate court, the trial court should reinstate the original
judgment of dissolution retroactively to the date of modification.
This will result in placing the parties in the same position as they
were in prior to the modification proceedings.""
J. Appeals
An appeal by an appellant who is in contempt of the lower court
may be dismissed upon petition of the appellee unless the appellant
purges himself of the contempt by complying with the order of the
trial court. 106
A commitment order in contempt proceedings which recites
that the former husband is in contempt for failure to pay court costs
when he has the ability to pay, is not subject to attack by habeas
corpus proceedings instead of an appeal from the order of contempt
when the husband contends that he does not have the means to
pay. 107
K. Legislation
The chief judge of any judicial circuit with the approval of the
county commissioners may now authorize the creation of a central
system for the enforcement of support, alimony or maintenance
payments ordered by the courts. The system is to be administered
by an administrator (who must be a member of the Florida Bar)
appointed by the chief judge. The act would seem broad enough to
permit the administrator to enforce support awards for the wealthy
as well as the indigent; inasmuch as county funds will be the pri-
mary source of support, it would appear that this is one more step
towards "judicare."90 8
104. Mansfield v. Mansfield, 309 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
105. Bock v. Bock, 311 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
106. Durham v. Durham, 297 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
107. Gazil v. Heidtman, 309 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).




A. Jurisdiction and Res Judicata
A trial court may enter an interlocutory order granting a disso-
lution of marriage and in the same order reserve jurisdiction to
determine property rights at a later time.' 9
A final dissolution of marriage judgment is res judicata as to
all property rights of the parties which were raised or which could
have been raised in the action, and a court may enjoin a former
spouse from bringing an action in a foreign state concerning the
property." 0
Once the trial court has adjudicated the property rights of the
spouses in a judgment which has become final, the chancellor may
not subsequently redetermine those rights."'
If a husband has agreed to maintain a life insurance policy on
his life for the benefit of his former wife and this agreement has been
incorporated into a dissolution judgment, a court may not later
order that the beneficiary be changed from the wife to the children
because her interest in the policy was a property right not subject
to modification under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes."'
B. Homestead
A divorced, unremarried man who has lived alone and who has
neither provided support or control for his minor daughters nor ever
lived with them in his home can still be the head of a family under
the Florida homestead laws and any devise of the property made by
him will be invalid."
3
A complaint brought by children alleging that their father,
without consideration, conveyed homestead property to himself and
his wife (their mother) as an estate by the entirety, and asking the
court to declare the transaction to be void as an attempted aliena-
tion of homestead property under the Constitution of 1885, states a
cause of action."
4
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that sec-
tions 689.11(1) and (2) of the Florida Statutes, which purport to
permit the conveyance of homestead property by a husband to the
109. Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
110. Simon v. Simon, 293 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
111. Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
112. Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
113. In re Estate of Deem v. Shinn, 297 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
114. Miller v. Miller. 293 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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wife (or vice versa) without the joinder of the spouse receiving the
title, is in conflict with article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Consti-
tution (as amended in 1972), which requires the joinder of the other
spouse when the owner alienates the homestead, and is, therefore,
unconstitutional. The legislature seems to be unable to remedy the
original error covering homesteads and tenancies by the entirety."'
In the absence of minor children (even though there are adult
children), a testator can devise homestead property to his surviving
wife under article X, section 4 of the Constitution of Florida adopted
in 1968 (as amended in 1972).11
C. Partition
It was decided in the case of Walton v. Walton"7 that a trial
court may make an equitable division of real property between the
spouses even if it is held as an estate by the entirety provided one
of the spouses seeks this relief and it is tried by the court without
objection by the other spouse. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, has refused to follow the lead of the Walton case, however,
and has held that a prayer for the division of the spouses' property
as contained in a dissolution of marriage complaint is an insufficient
predicate for a court to decree a partition of the parties' property;
the parties must proceed in accordance with chapter 64 of the Flor-
ida Statutes."'
The awarding to a former wife of the exclusive use and posses-
sion of the jointly owned family home for the benefit of the former
wife and children does not prevent her from subsequently waiving
this benefit by bringing an action for partition."'
A court in dissolution proceedings has no authority to award to
a former husband his former wife's joint interest in a business and
the property upon which it is located unless the parties agree to this
division or the former husband properly pleads for partition. 0
D. Special Equities Doctrine
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in a split deci-
115. Foerster v. Foerster, 300 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
116. In re McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974).
117. 290 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
118. Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), followed in Ramirez v.
Ramirez, 302 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); accord, Wischmon v. Wischmon, 310 So. 2d 428
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
119. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 305 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
120. Wilbur v. Wilbur, 299 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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sion has held that in order to prove a special equity in property it is
only necessary to prove the case by "clear and convincing"'' testi-
mony. The dissenting judge was of the view that the well established
law of Florida makes it mandatory for the prevailing party to prove
his or her case "to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.'
'12
In order for a wife to prove a special equity in property held as
an estate by the entirety it is necessary for her to trace her funds or
property into the subject home; proof that her property was used to
buy a new car and pay living expenses for the couple would not be
sufficient. 121
In the absence of fraud, after a husband has conveyed to his
wife his interest in jointly held property, he is not entitled to a
special equity in this property unless he made some "new significant
contribution to the value of the property, either financially or in
services, so that it would be inequitable for the grantee to retain the
entire property without recognition of this special equity.' 24
There seems to be no objection to a Florida court (which has
jurisdiction over the parties) granting a wife a special equity in real
estate (a service station) owned by the husband in a foreign state.2 "
It is reversible error for a trial court to deny a wife the right to
amend her petition for dissolution of marriage when she seeks to
show that her husband's parents had made a gift to the couple of
the marital condominium while the parents retained title in their
own name and held title as trustees for the wife and her husband.
She may nonetheless seek to establish her own interest in the con-
dominium and a special equity in her husband's interest.1
26
In her suit praying for dissolution of her marriage, a wife's
motion to compel discovery of the books and records of an out-of-
state corporation, an accounting and a special equity in the corpora-
tion should not be denied because it is an out-of-state corporation
which was not a party to the suit and the husband is the sole owner
of the corporation.'27 However, when a corporation is not a party to
a dissolution proceeding, it is improper for the court to adjudicate
that the wife does not have a special equity in certain properties of
the corporation.'
121. Abbott v. Abbott, 297 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
122. Id. at 609.
123. Baker v. Baker, 315 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
124. Floyd v. Floyd, 297 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
125. Razzano v. Razzano, 307 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
126. Goldberg v. Goldberg, 309 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
127. Lytton v. Lytton, 289 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
128. Couture v. Couture, 307 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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If the wife's parents lent money to the wife to be used to make
the downpayment for the purchase of the marital home, the wife
would be entitled to a special equity upon dissolution. Conversely,
if the loan was made to the husband and wife jointly, she would not
be entitled to a special equity.' 9
Neither spouse may alone encumber real property held as an
estate by the entirety, and a divorce judgment is not final until it
is written and signed by the judge. A combination of these two rules
renders invalid a mortgage executed by the wife alone on entirety
property on the same day that the judge orally stated that the
marriage was to be dissolved when the written final judgment was
executed thereafter.'
30
It is the well established rule in Florida that when a husband
purchases property with his own funds and the title is placed in the
name of both the husband and wife there is a presumption of law
that the husband intended to make a gift to the wife. This presump-
tion, however, only extends to those payments made by the husband
during the time the parties lived together, and if the husband made
any mortgage payments subsequent to the permanent separation of
the parties, the presumption would not apply. The husband should
be granted a special equity in the property to the extent of his
payment of his wife's share of the payments.' 3'
E. Beyond the Special Equities Doctrine
A trial court may not, after finding specifically that the wife is
not entitled to alimony, or to a special equity interest in jointly held
real property, award an interest in the property to her on the basis
that she changed her position in entering into the marriage with the
hope that it would succeed and that she should, therefore, receive
some kind of an award based upon that expectation.'
Moreover, it is improper to award a husband a one-half interest
in real property owned by his wife on the general equitable principle
that he is entitled to "greater consideration" than a simple order
dissolving the marriage because during the marriage he adopted his
wife's son by a prior marriage and supported him and the wife
during the marriage. 113
129. Howard v. Howard, 310 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
130. Leitner v. Willaford, 306 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
131. Heinemann v. Heinemann, 314 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
132. Hanzelik v. Hanzelik, 294 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
133. DeLones v. DeLones, 297 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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In the absence of proof that a husband has a special equity in
the wife's one-half interest in an estate by the entirety or that he is
entitled to alimony, it is reversible error for a trial court to award
the wife's one-half interest in a tenancy by the entirety to the hus-
band on the basis that the marriage lasted only 121 "constantly
battling" days during which time the parties conveyed property to
each other jointly as tenants by the entirety.'34
It is an abuse of discretion and thus reversible error for a trial
court to award the husband's interest in the marital home (held as
an estate by the entirety) "in lieu of any further alimony, either
rehabilitative or permanent."'' 5
F. Estates by the Entirety and in Common
If a marital home is held as an estate by the entirety, it is error
for the trial court to order that it be placed in trust for the use and
benefit of the minor children and that subsequent thereto the prop-
erty be mortgaged to raise funds to pay the debts of the parties, in
the absence of any pleadings asking for this form of relief.'30
In the absence of proper pleadings, it is also reversible error to
adjudge that the marital home (held as an estate by the entirety)
should be sold when the children reach their majority and the pro-
ceeds divided equally between the former spouses.3 7
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that when no special equity has
been proven and the award is not lump-sum alimony, the trial court
cannot order a husband to convey his interest in jointly held prop-
erty to his wife.131 On the other hand, a district court subsequently
held that it is permissible for a trial court to award to the wife the
husband's interest in an estate by the entirety in the family home
based upon the length of the marriage, the age and health of the
wife, etc. 131
When the marital home is owned by the husband alone and the
husband and wife sign a deposit receipt contract to sell the property,
this does not suffice to show an intention to create an estate by the
entirety in the proceeds of the sale. If the husband should then die
134. McKay v. McKay, 293 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
135. Venzer v. Venzer, 308 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
136. Arnold v. Arnold, 292 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
137. Riggs v. Riggs, 310 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
138. Owen v. Owen, 284 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1973).
139. Hiltz v. Hiltz, 295 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1974).
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before the closing, the wife is entitled to a dower interest in the
proceeds of sale. 40
It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order the
husband to pay the mortgage payments, taxes and insurance on the
marital home owned by the former spouses as tenants in common
because the original judgment provided that both parties could con-
tinue to live in the home after the divorce and he continued to do
SO. 
14 1
In the absence of a special equity, it is error for a trial court to
award to the husband the exclusive possession of the marital home
(entirety property) until his death, remarriage, until he moves, or
until the property is sold, when there are no minor children who are
to live in the home.
42
A final dissolution judgment which provides that the wife and
minor children should have the right to occupy the marital home
(entirety property) should also provide that this right to continued
occupancy will terminate upon her remarriage. In addition, when
the judgment orders the husband to pay the mortgage payments,
taxes and insurance during the period the property is occupied by
the former wife, the judgment should provide that in the event of a
sale of the property the former husband will be entitled to a credit
from the sales proceeds of one-half of the amount paid for mainte-
nance of the home.
43
A trial court may now under the Dissolution of Marriage Act
award exclusive possession of a home formerly held by the entirety
to a husband who has been granted custody of the minor children
of the marriage. 4
G. Temporary Relief
Under the Dissolution of Marriage Act, a trial court has the
power to grant temporary relief by ordering the wife to transfer
money from her savings account (the funds in question were for-
merly held in a joint account of the spouses and she withdrew the
funds and opened her account) to the husband for use in his used
car business as operating capital. It was noted by the appellate court
that this order provided that the husband was to account for this
140. In re Cardini, 305 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
141. Carter v. Carter, 306 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
142. Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
143. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 312 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
144. Richardson v. Richardson, 315 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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money and that it was not a final determination of ownership of the
funds. '"
H. Gifts Between Spouses
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has followed the
case of Steinhauer v. Steinhauer' by holding that when the wife's
separate funds are used to purchase property as an estate by the
entirety she is presumed to have made a gift to her husband. The
court further held that this change in presumption dated from the
adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution rather than from the
adoption of the 1971 Dissolution of Marriage Act.'47
If the husband deposits money in a joint savings account with
his wife, a rebuttable presumption arises that he has made a gift to
her of at least one-half of the account.1
48
Similarly, a husband who changes a stock brokerage account in
his name to a joint account in his and his wife's names in order to
protect the account from potential creditors, and who then fails to
change the account after the potential danger is removed, may be
deemed to have made a gift to his wife of a one-half interest in the
account.
4
The facts in Green v. Green'" would make a classic law school
examination question. A trial lawyer, having tax difficulties, de-
vised a system whereby certain income checks would not be depos-
ited in his office account. Rather they were delivered to a bank with
a cover letter instructing it to collect the checks and then issue
cashier's checks made payable to his wife for the office manager
account and the remaining checks to the lawyer or his wife. He died
two days after delivering the check and the latter to the collecting
bank. His widow then received the cashier's checks and cashed
them. The tax problems had been settled in the meantime. Two
witnesses testified that that the lawyer intended that the money was
to be his wife's. The appellate court held that: (1) the requisite
intention of the donor to transfer a present interest, (2) delivery by
the donor, and (3) acceptance of the gift by the donee were proven.
145. Yohem v. Yohem, 295 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
146. 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
147. Ball v. Ball, 303 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), followed in Farris v. Farris, 304 So.
2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
148. Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
149. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 310 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
150. 314 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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I. Dower
Widowers were allowed to elect to take dower under two amend-
ments to the Florida statutes; one amendment specifically says that
it shall not be applicable to any estate whose administration
commenced prior to the effective date of the amendment;' the
other amendment does not have similar language. 5 ' The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that neither amendment
was to be given retroactive effect and neither was therefore applica-
ble to estates being administered prior to the effective date of both
amendments.5 2
J. Contracts to Make a Will
Section 731.051 of the Florida Statutes provides that no agree-
ment to make a will, give a legacy, or make a devise shall be valid
unless it is in writing and signed in the presence of two subscrib-
ing witnesses, by the person whose executor or administrator is
sought to be charged. In Donner v. Donner,'54 a husband and wife
entered into a separation agreement in New York which provided
that the husband promised to devise one-third of his estate to his
wife provided that she survived him and remained unmarried. The
separation agreement was not witnessed. Subsequently, an Ala-
bama divorce court ratified the agreement, but it was not merged
in the judgment. Still later, a Florida court enforced certain provi-
sions of the agreement, and then a New York court upheld the
agreement over the former husband's contention that it was collu-
sive and against the public policy of New York. In the instant pro-
ceedings, instituted after the husband's death, the Florida court
held that the three court proceedings in Alabama, Florida and New
York barred the contention that the agreement was not in accord-
ance with the Florida statute on the grounds of res judicata and full
faith and credit. Judge Carroll, in a strong dissent, pointed out that
this statutory defense could not have been asserted by the former
husband during his lifetime because the agreement would not come
into contention until he died and was survived by his former wife
who was then single. As a consequence, the prior judgments were
neither res judicata nor entitled to full faith and credit except for
those matters which were actually decided in these cases. The dis-
151. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-106 §5.
152. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-107.
153. In re Geringer, 300 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
154. 302 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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sent further reasoned that neither New York nor Alabama could
enter a judgment overturning the statutory law of Florida.
K. Miscellaneous
A husband cannot be imprisoned for contempt for his failure to
make monthly payments to his former wife which were to be used
to pay a mortgage on property formerly owned by the spouses. The
court asserted that these payments were not alimony but a debt,
and article 1, section 11 of the Florida Constitution forbids impris-
onment for debt.'55
When a complaint for specific performance for the purchase of
land names only the husband as a defendant and the record does
not indicate that the property is homestead or the separate property
of the wife, and the complaint does not seek the relinquishment of
any possible dower interest of the wife, the complaint states a cause
of action for specific performance against the husband alone.5"
When a husband assigns the income from his interest in an
apartment complex as collateral for a loan and subsequently dies,
his widow is not entitled to her dower interest in this income under
section 731.34 of the Florida Statutes.1
57
L. Legislation
A family member may now appoint his spouse, parent or child
as his attorney under a "durable family power of attorney" by
executing a written instrument which states that "this durable fam-
ily power of attorney shall not be affected by disability of the princi-
pal except provided by statute." This power of attorney is non-
delegable and shall be valid until revoked or until the principal shall
die or be adjudged incompetent. The power of attorney will be sus-
pended at the time a petition to determine competency of the prin-
cipal has been filed. It appears that the agent under this power of
attorney has the power to convey and mortgage all property, both
real and personal, whether a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety
of the principal, with the exception of homestead property.
58
The Gift to Minors Act has been amended to provide that a
minor is a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, and to
155. Corbin v. Etheridge, 296 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
156. Clark v. Byrne, 297 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
157. Morton v. Morton, 297 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
158. FtA. STAT. § 709.08 (Supp. 1974).
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provide that the custodian is to turn over gift property to a donee
when he has become 18 years old except in those cases where gifts
were made prior to July 1, 1973. In the latter cases, custodial prop-
erty is not to be delivered to the donee until he reaches the age of
21 years.'59
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., a federal agency, cannot
be required to pay an attorney's fee to a guardian ad litem ap-
pointed at the request of the agency to represent a non-resident
Cuban husband in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. 6 '
Even though a wife has flouted the authority of a court of an-
other state (to whose jurisdiction she had submitted herself) with
respect to child custody matters, a Florida court may still award
attorney's fees to her. Her actions will, however, be considered and
the amount to be paid by the husband reduced. 6'
It is reversible error for a trial court to award attorney's fees
when the pleadings do not seek an award and there is no evidence
presented as to this matter.'
Section 61.16 of the Florida Statutes, which provides for the
awarding of attorney's fees in any dissolution of marriage proceed-
ing and for enforcement and modification proceedings under chap-
ter 61, has been construed to authorize the awarding of attorney's
fees to the husband to be paid by the wife when the husband brings
suit to secure for the benefit of the children trust funds which have
been entrusted to the former wife in accordance with a divorce de-
cree. 
63
Under the terms of section 61.16 of the Florida Statutes, it is
proper for a trial court to award attorney's fees, suit money and
costs to a party who initiates modification proceedings for alimony
and child support."4
An order of contempt for failure to pay the former wife's attor-
ney's fees is absolutely void unless it specifically states that the
court finds that the former husband has the ability to obey the
command.65
159. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-31, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 710.02, 710.05 (1973).
160. Fernandez v. Larrea, 309 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
161. Spencer v. Spencer, 305 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
162. Bob v. Bob, 312 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
163. Blynder v. Blynder, 294 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
164. Darcy v. Darcy, 285 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
165. Ratner v. Ratner, 297 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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A clause in a property settlement agreement which provides
that "the wife specifically agrees to incur no obligation or other
indebtedness or expenses that may be chargeable to the Husband
• . ."' is not an express waiver of attorney's fees, and therefore,
when the former husband brings proceedings to modify a child cus-
tody award (which was made in the original divorce judgment) the
former wife may be entitled to attorney's fees for defending the
proceedings.
An award of $17,500 attorney's fees was upheld when the testi-
mony of attorneys was that a reasonable fee ranged from $7,500 to
$25,000. However, since the husband earned only $250.00 per week,
the appellate court ordered that the fee be paid in three equal an-
nual installments.
6 7
The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed an attorney's fee
award of $65,000 when the uncontradicted testimony showed that
between 135 and 150 hours of work had been devoted to a phase of
a case dealing with child support and alimony. The wife's expert
witness testified that a fee of between $75,000 and $100,000 would
be reasonable and the husband failed to present evidence of any
kind relative to the issue. This award would seem to be at the rate
of approximately $43.33 per hour. 68
In a most unusual case, it was held that when the parties to a
divorce settle their property rights (without the knowledge of their
respective attorneys) by executing a written agreement which states
that the "amount of attorney's fees shall be negotiated and deter-
mined between [the wife's attorney] and [the husband's attor-
ney],"' 69 it is the intent of the parties that the wife's attorney's fees
were to be paid by the husband without a full hearing as to the wife's
necessity and the husband's ability to pay. The husband's conten-
tion that the determination between the attorneys only fixed the
amount of the fee, not the question as to which party was to pay it,
was rejected by the court.
A trial court has the discretion to assess all costs against a
former spouse who has been the cause for incurring the costs be-
cause of her perjured testimony, but the assessment may not be
based upon the notion of punishment for her perjury. 7 °
166. Scott v. Scott, 303 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
167. Flipse v. Flipse, 305 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
168. Posner v. Posner, 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1975).
169. Novack v. Novack, 305 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
170. McKennon v. McKennon, 312 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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VII. ANTENUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
When a wife, in accordance with the terms of a valid antenup-
tial agreement, receives assets from her husband valued in excess
of $200,000 in lieu of any and all claims against him "for alimony,
suit money or other maintenance during the [husband's] life-
time,"'' it is reversible error to award permanent attorney's fees to
her.
B. Post-Nuptial Agreements
One district court has held that a court is not bound to follow
the alimony provisions set forth in a separation agreement,' 2 but
another "3 has decided that in light of the rationale of Posner v.
Posner,' which upheld the validity of antenuptial agreements as to
conditions existing at the time of the agreement (provided that the
conditions of Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio'75 are met), the alimony
provisions contained in a separation agreement which is not tainted
by fraud or overreaching and based upon full disclosure are valid as
to conditions existing at the time the agreement was made and must
be honored by the court.
1. INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
A property settlement agreement (subsequently made a part of
a judgment of dissolution of marriage) which provides that the wife
accepts "this Agreement in full satisfaction of all her right of dower,
or right of alimony or other special equities in the properties which
she might otherwise have been entitled to receive" is not sufficient
to show the intent of the parties to relinquish an expectancy interest
of the former wife in the proceeds of a life insurance policy and a
profit sharing trust in which the former husband named his ex-wife
as the beneficiary.' It has been held that when a separation agree-
ment provides that the husband shall pay for alimony "the sum of
$35.00 per week for a period of five (5) years, being a total of
171. Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
172. Harris v. Harris, 291 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
173. Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
174. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
175. 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
176. Davis v. Davis, 301 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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$9,100.00,"' 7 the parties must have intended this to be a lump-sum
alimony arrangement payable in weekly installments. The re-
marriage of the wife before the expiration of the five year period
would, therefore, not terminate the former husband's duty to con-
tinue to make weekly payments.
When a separation agreement (incorporated into the final judg-
ment of dissolution) provides that the husband should pay to the
wife "such income taxes on a quarterly basis upon the foregoing
sums [alimony] as shall be required by the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice . ".."7 this does not also make the husband liable to pay income
taxes assessed by the State and City of New York.
A property settlement agreement which provides that the
"Wife shall at all times enjoy the exclusive right to use Lots 'A' and
'C' as pasture land during the life estate of the Husband"'79 is a valid
restrictive covenant which will be enforced by the courts because it
is for a lawful purpose, within reasonable bounds and the language
is clear, notwithstanding the view that restrictive covenants are not
favored by the law.
If death of a spouse intervenes after the signing of a property
settlement agreement but before the completion of dissolution pro-
ceedings, parol evidence may be introduced to show that the prop-
erty settlement contract was not to be effective between the parties
until the dissolution judgment was entered, and, as a consequence,
since the agreement never became effective, the surviving spouse
becomes the sole owner of entirety property.'
2. MODIFICATION PROBLEMS
Florida courts have jurisdiction to modify separation agree-
ments entered into in a foreign state when the parties are now Flor-
ida residents. If the separation agreement provides that it is gov-
erned by New York law then the Florida court will apply the appro-
priate law of New York.''
Alimony payments which originate out of a property settlement
agreement may not be modified subsequently because of a change
of circumstances of the parties, and if the husband mistakenly
brings proceedings to modify the amount of alimony, the court may
177. Home v. Horne, 289 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
178. Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 307 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
179. Zoda v. Zoda, 292 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
180. Greenwald v. Blume, 312 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
181. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 309 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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award attorney's fees to the wife who defends against the sought for
change.'82
In Waddell v. Waddell'3 a property settlement agreement pro-
vided that the husband was to convey the family home to the wife
"and pay all sums due or to become due upon the mortgage encum-
bering same and the taxes and insurance."'' 4 The District Court of
Appeals, Third District, interpreted the quoted words to constitute
a modifiable support provision rather than a nonmodifiable prop-
erty settlement obligation. This interpretation was based primarily
upon the notion that in construing the agreement as a whole and in
light of the fact that it provided for alimony and child support, it
was intended that these payments were to be in the nature of sup-
port rather than as a right attached to the land.
If the former wife is receiving alimony in accordance with the
terms of a separation agreement (incorporated into the final judg-
ment of dissolution) it would appear that she has no obligation to
try to rehabilitate herself unless the agreement so requires.'
The fact that a former wife has become employed since the
divorce (which approved the parties' separation agreement) may
not be enough by itself to justify a modification of the alimony
provisions of a separation agreement. The court should take into
consideration the parties' "previous and present earning capacities,
income and needs, changes in the cost of living, and perhaps even
the latest socio-legal views relating to support."'86
If the amount of alimony is based upon a separation agreement,
a heavier burden rests upon the former husband who is seeking a
reduction than would otherwise be required.'87
When a property settlement agreement provides for the hus-
band to pay alimony to the wife until she remarries, a court may
not terminate alimony on the grounds that the former wife has
entered into a de facto marriage by living with a man who is contrib-
uting to her support. It would appear that the amount of support
contributed by the "other man" may be considered by the court in
modification proceedings, but that the court may not terminate all
payments on the de facto marriage allegation.' 8
182. Yagoda v. Klein, 305 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
183. 305 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
184. Id.
185. Quinn v. Quinn, 307 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
186. Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
187. Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 307 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Quinn v. Quinn, 307 So.
2d 848 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Hagen v. Hagen, 308 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
188. Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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If a husband should agree to maintain a life insurance policy
on his life for the benefit of his wife and to make her the owner of
the policy in return for her giving up all claims for support, this
agreement constitutes a property settlement agreement which may
not be modified even though the wife has remarried and is being
supported by her new husband." 9
An interesting question was presented in In re Estate of
Ingram.'" A husband signed a separation agreement and mailed it
to the wife for her execution. The wife told her attorney about a
furniture bill owed by the husband and the attorney told the hus-
band's attorney that if the husband would pay the bill the wife
would sign the separation agreement which included a provision
giving up her dower interest in the husband's property. The hus-
band's attorney sent a check for the furniture bill to the wife's
attorney and she executed the agreement. Before her attorney
mailed the agreement back to the husband's attorney, the wife
asked her attorney to "hold the papers." A few weeks later, the
husband died, and the wife's attorney asserted that the agreement
was null and void and that she was entitled to dower.
The court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not
present because there was no evidence that the husband was in-
duced to take any action or forebearance of a substantial nature
since he was in reality only paying his own debt, not the debt of the
wife. In addition, the agreement was under seal and delivery by the
wife to her attorney, in light of her testimony about her intentions
regarding the dissolution proceedings, showed that she did not in-
tend it to be binding upon her. As a result, the widow was entitled
to dower.
A court does not have the power to effectuate a property settle-
ment between a husband and wife in the absence of an actual agree-
ment between the parties or proper pleadings.'
3. ENFORCEMENT
The violation of a property settlement agreement may not be
met with the sanction of a contempt order, but only by the normal
remedies of a creditor against his debtor.'
189. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 312 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
190. 302 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
191. McCready v. McCready, 301 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
192. Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
19751
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
VIII. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody
1. JURISDICTION
A Florida court will not have jurisdiction over a minor nonresi-
dent child even though the court has jurisdiction over both parents
in a dissolution of marriage action.'93
2. CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD
In Lippincott v. Lippincott,"4 a dissolution of marriage judg-
ment awarded the custody of six children to their father "pending
receipt by the court of the report from Family Services, State Wel-
fare Department, the final award of custody to abide the recommen-
dation therein set forth."'95 Nine months later the report was re-
ceived by a successor trial court judge. The report recommended the
continued custody of two of the children with their father and that
custody of the remaining four children should be awarded to the
mother. The successor judge did not follow this recommendation,
however, but awarded custody of all six children to their father. The
appellate court held that the successor trial court judge was not
bound to follow her predecessor's decision to abide by the recom-
mendations of the Family Services report.
Section 61.20 of the Florida Statutes, which authorizes the use
of confidential reports from counselors of the Juvenile and Family
Division of the Circuit Court in family law matters was subjected
to a stinging attack by Chief Judge Owen of the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, on the grounds that these reports are viola-
tive of the due process rights of the parties. Judge Owen argued that
the parties are unable to test the credibility or qualifications of the
court counselor, the basis upon which the recommendations are
made, or the credibility or reliability of any of the alleged factual
matters set forth in the report."6
It is proper for a trial court to award custody of a minor child
to his grandparent, rather than to his mother, when it is in the best
interests of the child, and when the alternative would be to give
193. Reinhart v. Reinhart, 291 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); see Yelton v. Yelton, 295
So. 2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) which held that when the child is not within the state it is
"erroneous" to grant custody to the mother who never appeared in the action.
194. 287 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
195. Id.
196. Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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custody to the mother who was divorced from her third husband,
working and dating other men and had failed to indicate stability
in "her past lifestyle.'
'9 7
When both parents are equally fit to have custody of twin
daughters two and one-half years old, and when the children have
always been taken care of by baby-sitters because both parents have
been employed, it is not error for the trial court to award custody
to the father and to order the mother to contribute $25.00 per week
towards their support. There "should be no conclusive presumption
that children of tender years must always be placed in the custody
of the mother."' 98
Under section 61.13(2) of the Florida Statutes, the mother of
very young children should receive "prime consideration for cus-
tody, providing all else is equal. However, there is no conclusive
presumption that the mother is entitled to custody, even where
everything else is equal."' 99
In a somewhat confused opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
has seemed to indicate that section 61.13(2) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides for equal consideration of the father and mother in
the awarding of custody, is not inconsistent with the older case law
in Florida which established that other things being equal, the
mother of infants of tender years is best fitted to have custody.""
It is not error for a trial court to hear expert opinion testimony
from an investigator with the domestic relations staff of the court
as to which parent should have custody.20'
Section 39.10 of the Florida Statutes provides that in all cases
where one or both of the parents of a child is unable or unfit to be
awarded custody and the child has a close relative who is fit, ready,
able and willing to be awarded custody, the court shall award the
custody of the child to such close relative and not to any foster home
or agency of the state. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
has applied this statute to a case where the mother and alleged
father of an illegitimate child delivered the child to the Home So-
ciety and signed forms committing the child for adoption in behalf
of the maternal grandparents who sought custody. The Home So-
197. Brannan v. Brannan, 284 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
198. Anderson v. Anderson, 289 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), aff'd, 309 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1975).
199. Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
200. Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975), affg 289 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1974).
201. Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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ciety strenuously contested the application of the statutes and as-
serted that the grandparents had no standing to seek custody after
the natural parents had relinquished it. The child having lived with
the maternal grandparents for ten months, the court apparently
"stretched" the statute in order to achieve a just result."2 Of course,
unless the natural parents are found to be unfit, permanent custody
may not be awarded to the grandparents. °' A court may, however,
award custody of a child to its mother and the maternal grandpar-
ents when the court believes that the grandparents "might play a
significant role in assisting to bring about a better domestic environ-
ment for the child.
°20 4
A child's preference may be considered by a court in awarding
custody, but the court is not required to consider it or even to ques-
tion the child regarding his preference.0 5
The "moral unfitness" of the mother who committed adultery
while the child was in the house does not necessarily make her an
unfit mother. Whether the adultery had a direct bearing on the
welfare of the child is a question of fact for the trier of fact.2 0
3. DIVIDED CUSTODY
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has seemingly
frowned upon child custody orders which in effect provide for div-
ided custody. °7 In a subsequent case it rejected a father's contention
that he ought to be granted custody during the summer in order to
send his children to a private school of which he was headmaster.
The father cited authority which had permitted divided custody,
"[b]ut, unquestionably, split custody decrees, particularly for chil-
dren of tender years, are not encouraged.
200
4. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS
A court may temporarily commit children in an emergency sit-
uation to the custody of the Division of Family Services for suitable
202. In re R.J.C., 300 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). See also Van Meter v. Murphy,
287 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
203. Besade v. Besade, 312 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
204. Forman v. Forman, 315 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
205. Kitchens v. Kitchens, 305 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
206. Dinkel v. Dinkel, No. 46, 764 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 1975) rev'g 305 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1974).
207. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 304 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
208. Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); accord, Unger v. Unger,
206 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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foster home placement on the grounds that the children are depen-
dent as a result of the neglect of their mother, "without a noticed
hearing"2' 9 and in advance of a later hearing at which time the
mother is given an opportunity to appear.
It would appear that there is no requirement for a trial court
to appoint an attorney to represent an allegedly indigent mother in
a child custody action brought by the father." '
The due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment do not require that indigent parents named as respon-
dents in child dependency proceedings or their children be advised
of their rights to counsel. Nor does it require that the state supply
counsel. Furthermore, if the parents have voluntarily relinquished
their rights to custody, the proceedings are not adverse and in non-
adversary proceedings there is no necessity for the appointment of
counsel.2"'
A county in Florida is not required by law to pay the cost of
publication for an indigent parent who wishes to change the names
of his minor children when the parent cannot obtain personal serv-
ice of process upon the other parent.212
5. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Although a Florida court is not required to give full faith and
credit to a foreign judgment awarding custody of children to a par-
ent, the court may enforce the judgment under the principles of
comity when the court finds that it is in the best interest of the
children to do so.
213
6. VISITATION RIGHTS
It is error for a court in its final judgment to condition a parent's
right of visitation upon timely payment of support .
21
An order granting weekend visitation rights to paternal grand-
parents, when exclusive custody of a child has been granted to the
mother, "is unjustified and unenforceable.1
21
209. Sedberry v. State, 286 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
210. Richter v. Richter, 307 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975). It should be noted that
neither the mother nor her attorney furnished proof of her indigence.
211. Potvin v. Keller, 299 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
212. Dade County v. Womack, 285 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
213. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 294 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
214. Chaffin v. Grigsby, 293 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
215. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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A trial court may not alter visitation rights upon the oral mo-
tion of one of the parties; written pleadings are required." 6
In the absence of an emergency affecting the welfare of the
children, a trial court may not modify visitation privileges granted
to a former husband in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage,
in the absence of any pleadings filed by the former wife."1 7
When a dissolution judgment provides that the father should
have "all reasonable rights of visitation with said minor children," '
and the wife, with permission of the court, then moves to a foreign
state, she is not required by this language to permit her former
husband to take the children from the foreign state to Florida to
visit him for a period of weeks. If the father should desire to have
his children visit him in Florida, he should seek modification of the
judgment in appropriate proceedings.
7. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY
A circuit court of one county is without jurisdiction to modify
the final judgment of another county as to child custody and visita-
tion rights,"9 and the court which makes the original judgment gov-
erning custody has continuing jurisdiction to modify it; a writ of
prohibition will lie to prevent the circuit court in another county
from taking jurisdiction.1
It is reversible error for a trial court to dismiss a case on the
grounds of forum non conveniens when a child custody decree
sought to be modified is a Florida decree in which the court retained
jurisdiction, even though neither parent is now a resident of Florida.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should be limited to those
cases in which both parties are nonresidents and the cause of action
accrued in a foreign jurisdiction.2 '
An order changing an award of custody need not contain a
finding that the prior custodian is now unfit to have custody; nega-
tive factors in the prior custodian's life plus new additional needs
of the child and an increased ability to provide for support by the
other parent will be sufficient to justify a change of custody.2
A trial court need not make specific findings that the parent
216. Purvis v. Carver, 303 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
217. Childress v. Childress, 309 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
218. Kranis v. Kranis, 313 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
219. Ward v. Wells, 298 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
220. Wells v. Ward, 314 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1975).
221. Morgan v. Ande, 313 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
222. Jayne v. Dennison, 284 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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who was originally awarded custody has become unfit, that there
has been a material change in conditions, or that the best interests
of the child would be accomplished by a change in custody.223 An-
other court has opined, however, that in order to uphold an order
changing custody from one parent to the other it is necessary to
show not only a substantial change in conditions since the entry of
the original order but also that the change will promote the welfare
of the child.224
When the evidence shows that a divorced woman has shared
her apartment overnight with various men while her children were
present; that she has suffered from emotional instability and was
hospitalized with a nervous breakdown; that the children have
changed for the worse in recent months and the trial court has taken
custody of her children from her and awarded it to the former hus-
band, it cannot be said that the change was based solely upon the
fact that the woman was planning to marry a black man.225
If the facts show that a former wife is living in adultery with a
married man (who was separated from his wife) and that the chil-
dren of the former wife are aware of what is transpiring, this is
sufficient justification for a court to modify a former child custody
award and to grant custody to the father.226
In order to support an order modifying an award of custody it
is necessary to show a substantial or material change in facts since
the rendition of the original order. Allegations that the former hus-
band has since retired and can spend more time with his children,
that they have been living with him since the original order and
desired to continue to do so, and that the children while living with
the mother were obliged to awaken early in the morning because of
her employment thus interfering with their sleep and causing them
to do poorly in school, were not sufficient to justify a change.227
Visitation rights granted in a dissolution judgment may be
modified in subsequent proceedings even in the absence of a specific
prayer for this relief when the facts show that the emotional conflict
between the parties has affected the children and the protection of
the interests of the children requires this relief.22
223. Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
224. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 311 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Spradley v. Spradley,
312 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
225. Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
226. Young v. Young, 305 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
227. Avery v. Avery, 314 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
228. Giacoio v. Giacoio, 286 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that a
change of custody from the father to the mother may be ordered
when the record in the first case showed that all the children (whose
ages ranged from 11-15) desired to live with their mother rather than
with their father who had used an authoritarian attitude and impro-
per inducements (gifts and promises of gifts) to induce the children
to express a desire to stay with him."9 In a second case, the child
expressed a desire to stay with his father; however, the appellate
court awarded custody to the mother on the ground that the child's
desires may have been improperly influenced by a lavish supply of
material things given to him by his father."' Compare these cases
with Kitchens v. Kitchens23 which holds that a court need not con-
sider the child's wishes in awarding custody in the first instance.
Administrative Order No. 73-15 of the Circuit Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, which authorizes the referral of "post-
decretal matters involving child support, maintenance and ali-
mony" to an appointed General Master, does not encompass a case
involving the question of modification of custody. Further, it would
be improper to refer objections made to the General Master's Report
to a Special Master if this constituted an abdication of responsibil-
ity by the trial court. 32
8. LEGISLATION
A new provision was added to section 61.13 of the Florida Stat-
utes to provide that in any custody proceeding brought under chap-
ter 61, the court has jurisdiction over children who are physically
present in Florida at the time of the filing of the proceedings, if it
shall appear that the children were "removed from this state for the
primary purpose of removing the said child or children from the
jurisdiction of the court in any attempt to avoid a determination of
custody."'33
A new subsection has been added to section 61.13 of the Florida
Statutes to delineate the factors which a trial court judge should
consider in child custody matters. This amendment is, at best, a
redundant restatement of case law, and, at worst, a trap for the
unwary trial court judge if he fails to make mention of each of the
229. Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
230. Gregory v. Gregory, 292 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
231. 305 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). See note 205 supra and accompanying text.
232. Bell v. Bell, 307 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).




standards in writing his custody order. If the trial court judge recites




When a father is on active duty in the military and the mother
secures a foreign order modifying a previous child support award
without any attempt to comply with the pertinent provision of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,3 the order is not void
but only voidable at the instance of the serviceman if he is able to
show prejudice by reason of his military service in making a defense
and that he has a meritorious or legal defense to the action. Further,
when the mother brings suit in Florida to secure a domestic judg-
ment for arrearages accruing from nonpayment under this foreign
order, the foreign order is entitled to full faith and credit in Florida
unless it is subject to modification for accrued amounts in the state
which entered the order. 3'
A court has no power to order a father to pay child support
"until the child reaches the age of twenty-one (21) or completes or
discontinues his college education, whichever shall first occur," un-
less the father has entered into an agreement to this effect. 3
2. DISCOVERY
The District Court Of Appeal, Third District, has slightly mo-
dified the rule of Birge v. Simpson,"8 by holding that although a
successive spouse's financial position is discoverable as material
and relevant to the ability of a child's natural parent to fulfill his
or her duty of support, this discovery can be conducted only upon a
"clear and convincing showing that the remarried parent is unable
to discharge the duty to provide for the needs of the child out of her
or his own funds."' 9
3. AMOUNT
An award of $112.50 per week as support and alimony for a wife
234. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-99, creating FLA. STAT. § 63.13(3) (1975).
235. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 520 (1970).
236. Courtney v. Warner, 290 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
237. Kowalski v. Kowalksi, 315 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
238. 280 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
239. Condon v. Condon, 295 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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and three children ages 2, 3 and 5, to be paid by the father who is
earning $70,000 per year, is erroneous as being too small. 4 Con-
versely, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that
a child support award of $200 per month for one 18 year old child
is excessive when the wife was awarded $300 per month and the
husband has a net take home pay of $1,000 per month. The child
support awarded was reduced to $100 per month.24'
4. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
The allegations of a father that he did not have the advice of
counsel when he entered into a child support agreement and that
he thereby had agreed to pay too much child support are totally
inadequate grounds for modification.4
It has been held that section 61.14 of the Florida Statues is
broad enough to enable a circuit court of the county in which one
of the parties to a former marriage resides to modify a judgment
providing for child support payments which was entered by the
court in a different county over the protestations that the venue is
improper. Further, a petition to modify the support judgment may
be served upon the other party even though the proceedings are
instituted in a county other than the one which rendered the original
order, and this will confer jurisdiction over the person "served." 4 '
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, unpaid child
support payments constitute a vested right which are not subject to
retroactive modification."
It is reversible error for a trial court to change the date of
termination of a previous child support award when this fact was
neither raised in the pleadings nor touched upon in any way in
proceedings brought to increase the amount of the award.245
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a cloudy opinion, 4 ' has ap-
proved the decision in Finn v. Finn47 by holding that section 743.07
of the Florida Statutes was not to be given a retroactive effect so as
to affect support orders entered prior to July 1, 1973, the effective
date of the Act. Further, the court disapproved the holding in White
240. Arnold v. Arnold, 292 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
241. Nevins v. Nevins, 305 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
242. Hicks v. Hicks, 313 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
243. Sikes v. Sikes, 286 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
244. Teta v. Teta, 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
245. Roberts v. Costanza, 302 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
246. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
247. 294 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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v. White4 ' and held that a father (in accordance with subsection 3
or section 743.07) may be held liable for the support of his children
after majority and while they are undergraduate college students.
The concept of dependency is not limited to physical or mental
disability, but may extend to children who are financially depen-
dent upon their parents for a college education. The court seemed
to limit the parents' liability to the period extending between ages
18 and 21. This decision has been interpreted by the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, to mean that a court has no power to
order a parent to support his 23 year old son who is a college student
in the absence of any mental or physical deficiency. 4 The reader is
cautioned that a 1975 legislative amendment may possibly limit the
application of the Finn rule that a parent may be liable for the
support of his adult children who are in college. 5
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that
when a property settlement agreement used such words as "minor-
ity," "coming of age," and "attained majority by age or mar-
riage," I" it is proper for a court to terminate child support when the
children reach the age of eighteen even though the age of majority
at the time of the signing of the agreement was twenty-one. The
result would have been different however, if the agreement had
given a stated age.
The District Court of Appeal, First District,"' has refused to
follow the lead of the Third District,"' and has held that there is no
basis for a trial court to order a parent to pay child support retroac-
tively to a date prior to the filing of the complaint.
It is reversible error for a trial court to modify child support
provisions of a decree of dissolution of marriage in the absence of
any pleadings requesting this modification. '
In reversing the decision in Small v. Small,255 the Supreme
248. White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). The supreme court in Finn
also effectively overruled Ruttnau v. Ruttnau, 299 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), Smith v.
Smith, 309 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975), French v. French, 303 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1974), while apparently approving Field v. Field, 291 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974) and
Ackerly v. Ackerly, 296 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). See also Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308
So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1975).
249. Briggs v. Briggs, 312 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); accord, Kartub v. Kartub,
312 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
250. See note 261 infra and accompanying text.
251. Dalton v. Dalton, 304 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
252. Warren v. Warren, 306 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
253. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 148 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); accord, Friedman v.
Friedman, 307 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
254. DeWalt v. DeWalt, 305 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
255. 313 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1975), rev'g 299 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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Court of Florida has held that a trial court's denial of a father's
petition for modification of the alimony and support provisions of a
dissolution judgment on the grounds that the father has failed to
prove sufficient facts to justify a modification is a final judgment
(rather than an interlocutory one), and that a motion for rehearing
tolled the running of the time for appeal until it was disposed of.
It is reversible error to make an apportionment between ali-
mony and child support retroactive to a time prior to the filing of a
former wife's motion for apportionment; the apportionment should
not be retroactive prior to the date of the filing of the motion be-
cause the husband would have "a vested interest" for tax purposes
until the apportionment became effective. "
A court under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Law is strictly limited to the determination of the duty of support,
and it cannot terminate this duty because the mother has refused
to allow the father to visit his children.
257
5. MISCELLANEOUS
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to award to the
wife as child support for children ages 10 and 13 the exclusive use
of the marital home for a period of five years. At the end of this
period the wife would be free to seek modification by asking for
continued use of the home if it was needed for the children. 258
A father has an obligation to support his children in spite of the
fact that his wife has obtained a foreign divorce judgment against
him. 259
Furthermore, a father may be compelled to maintain life insur-
ance on his own life for the benefit of his minor children and to
maintain medical and dental insurance for the children on the basis
that these insurance policies can be considered as security for the
payment of support and medical expenses. 20
6. LEGISLATION
Sections 61.13(1) and 61.14(1) of the Florida Statutes have been
amended to provide that the courts have the power to modify sup-
port orders and property settlement provisions dealing with child
support when the subject child or children reach the age of 18. The
256. Schalk v. Schalk, 312 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
257. Vecellio v. Vecellio, 313 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
258. Rowles v. Rowles, 299 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
259. Ciociola v. Ciociola, 302 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
260. Moore v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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amendment makes no mention of the subject of college education,
but it does appear to have a retroactive effect in the sense that the
amendments seem to apply to orders and agreements in existence
prior to the effective date of the act."6 '
IX. ADOPTION
Foster parents who have gained custody of a child by the con-
sent of the mother, who falsely assumed the last name of the foster
parents during childbirth, and who had the birth certificate falsely
executed showing the foster parents to be the natural parents, have
standing to contest a commitment action brought by the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. 2 '
In the absence of the natural father's consent to an adoption or
evidence that he has abandoned his child, a court is not warranted
in granting adoption to a stepfather, even though he is able to give
greater economic support than can the natural father.263
Former section 39.11 (5) of the Florida Statutes provided that
notice of adoption proceedings had to be given to the natural par-
ents unless it was waived by their executing "before two witnesses
and a notary public . . . , a written surrender of the child to a
licensed child placing agency . . . ... The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, has decided that this statute does not require that
there be two witnesses and a notary public but can be satisfied by
two witnesses, one of whom is a notary public.6 4 Virtually the same
language of former section 39.11(5) can now be found in the new
Adoption Act.65
A complaint for invasion of privacy brought by the adoptive
parents of a child against a newspaper for publishing a detailed
description of the adoption proceedings does not state a cause of
action when it fails to allege that the newspaper obtained its infor-
mation from confidential court files or the confidential files of the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or a licensed
child-placing agency, all of which are confidential under section
63.181 of the Florida Statutes.266
Any abandoned child who has been placed in a foster home may
261. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-67, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 61.13(1), 61.14(1), creating §
61.13(2)(a) (1974).
262. In re K.S.K., 294 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
263. La Follette v. Van Weelden, 309 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
264. Willis v. Florida State Div. of Family Servs., 283 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
265. FLA. STAT. § 63.012 (1973).
266. Jordan v. Pensacola News-Journal, Inc., 314 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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now be adopted if after a period of one year a diligent search has
failed to locate a parent or relative of the child."7
The Florida Adoption Act was amended to provide (among
other things) that unless consent is excused by the court, the father
of a minor must consent to the adoption when the minor is his child
by adoption, or has been judicially established as his, or he has
acknowledged in writing before a competent witness that he is the
father of the minor and has filed such acknowledgment with the
Bureau of Vital Statistics and he has provided the child with sup-
port "in a repetitive, customary manner." Further, no person except
an agency or the division shall take or send a child out of Florida
for placement for adoption unless the child is to be placed with a
relative within the third degree or a stepparent."'
X. JUVENILES
A. Dependent Children
The Supreme Court of Florida has agreed with the District
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District that a juvenile court does
not have the power to order a parent of a delinquent child to partici-
pate in, and to cooperate with, a drug rehabilitation program.,
However, as noted in the legislation subsection of this section, this
case has been superseded by a new statute which gives the courts
the power to require the cooperation of parents.27
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that section 39.11
(2)(a)(4) of the Florida Statues (which provides that a juvenile may
be adjudicated to be a dependent child and committed for adoption
when it has been abandoned by the natural parents, or they have
substantially refused or neglected to give support although they are
able to do so or they are unfit to have custody by reason of their
conduct which is seriously detrimental to the welfare of the child)
is neither unconstitutionally vague nor violative of fundamental due
process.27'
When the evidence clearly shows that a child is in a "grossly
abnormal condition" 2 as the result of severe malnutrition, it is
reversible error for the trial court to hold that the child is not a
267. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-159, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.11(2)(d) (1975).
268. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-226, amending FLA. STAT. ch. 63 (1974).
269. State v. S.M.G., 313 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1975), aff'g In re S.M.G., 291 So. 2d 43 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1974).
270. See note 306 infra.
271. In re Camm, 294 So. 2d 318 (Fla.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 121 (1974).
272. In re K.S.K., 294 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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dependent child under section 39.01(10) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides that a dependent child is one who does not have
proper parental support and care and who is neglected as to medical
or other care necessary for the well-being of the child.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the right to counsel
in juvenile dependency proceedings must be determined on a case-
by-case basis and that the criteria for offering counsel would include
"at least (i) the potential length of parent-child separation, (ii) the
degree of parental restrictions on visitation, (iii) the presence or
absence of parental consent, (iv) the presence or absence of disputed
facts, and (v) the complexity of the proceedings in terms of wit-
nesses and documents. 27
B. Delinquency and Criminal Proceedings
It is fundamental error for a court to try a juvenile for breaking
and entering with intent to commit larceny before a referee rather
than before a court, even if his public defender consents to this
procedure.24
When a notice of criminal charges against an unmarried minor
is mailed to his mother and subsequently returned unclaimed and
the child is thereafter sentenced, the judgment and sentence must
be reversed because of the failure of the record to show a compliance
with section 925.07 of the Florida Statutes.25
If the statutory notice is sent to "123 North Linville, Westland,
Michigan, ' '27 instead of to the correct address of "123 North Lin-
ville, West Lane, Michigan, 2 77 and the state produces neither a
return receipt showing the receipt of the notice, nor any other proof
that the minor's parents had actual knowledge of the charge, nor a
showing that an appropriate state official asked the minor defen-
dant to designate a relative or friend to receive the notice, then the
judgment and sentence are void.
Under the common law, there is a rebuttable presumption
that a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is legally incapable of
committing a crime. 78 This presumption has been held applicable
273. Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1975), citing Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d
940 (9th Cir. 1974).
274. H.P. v. State, 284 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
275. Douglas v. State, 295 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). FLA. STAT. § 925.07 requires
that notice be given to the parent or guardian if the name and address of such person are
known, or, if the name and address are not known, that notice be given a friend or relative
designated by the minor.
276. Thomas v. State, 301 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
277. Id. at 488.
278. Clay v. State, 143 Fla. 204, 196 So. 462 (Fla. 1940).
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to juvenile delinquency proceedings based upon a charge of man-
slaughter as defined under the criminal law. 79 If the evidence shows
that a mentally and academically retarded child picked up a gun
(which he thought was unloaded) and discharged it, killing a play-
mate, and there was no evidence showing any motive for the shoot-
ing, the charges against the child should have been dismissed when
the state failed to offer any evidence to overcome the presumption
of incapacity. 79
In a consistent vein, if the state, in delinquency proceedings
brought against a 9-year-old boy for participating in breaking into
a store and stealing a television set worth less than $100, should fail
to present any evidence of the capacity of the child to commit a
crime, then the proceedings must be dismissed.280
It has been held to be reversible error for a court to adjudicate
a minor as a delinquent child upon the grounds that she committed
an assault and battery upon two police officers and that she resisted
arrest when the facts showed that there was no justified cause for
arrest and that an arrest was never made."' The two officers at-
tempted to remove the minor girl from a closet in her own home
because of a request by the girl's mother.
When juvenile delinquency charges based upon three armed
robberies have been dismissed by the juvenile court because of a
violation of the speedy trial rule, 82 the alleged delinquent cannot
later be indicted by a grand jury for the same offenses and the
indictments must be dismissed.28
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that section 39.09(2) of
the Florida Statues is not basically inconsistent with Rule
8.110(b)(6)(c), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure (Temporary) in
so far as the requirements for the waiving of jurisdiction over juve-
niles accused of acts which would be crimes if they were adults is
concerned. Therefore, the court reversed a decision invalidating the
statute as unconstitutional in that it conflicted with the rule pro-
mulgated by the supreme court.8 4
Rule 8.100(b), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which pro-
vides that on demand the court shall waive juvenile jurisdiction and
certify the case for trial as if the child were an adult, is mandatory
279. In re E.P., 291 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
280. State v. D.H., 309 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
281. E.A.S. v. State, 291 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
282. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(1).
283. State ex rel. Kelly v. Rawlins, 289 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
284. Davis v. State, 297 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1974), followed in In re C.H.H., 298 So. 2d 208
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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upon timely demand of the juvenile because article I, section 22 of
the Constitution of Florida provides that the right to jury trial shall
be secure to all and article I, section 15(b) provides that "any child
so charged shall, upon demand made as provided by law. . . ,be
tried to an appropriate court as an adult.""' 5
A juvenile may waive his Miranda rights. If the facts show that
a 15-year-old tenth-grade male juvenile of average maturity and
intelligence was advised of all his rights (according to his own in-
court testimony), he may have his confession to the crime of arson
introduced against him.288
In the trial of a juvenile charged as a delinquent child for the
act of murder, the judge's conclusion that the juvenile's confession
is voluntary "must appear from the record with unmistakable clar-
ity.""28 A mere statement that the child's motion to suppress the
confession in the cause is denied is not enough.
Section 39.03(3) of the Florida Statutes provides that the per-
son taking a child into custody (for acts of delinquency) "shall,
without delay for the purpose of investigation or any other purpose,
deliver the child, by the most practicable route, to the court of the
county or district where the child is taken into custody." As a result,
if the police interrogate a juvenile regarding a charge of rape and
he confesses to the crime before the police deliver him to a judge,
this confession is inadmissible."'
A nolo contendere plea of a minor will be remanded when the
record does not show that the court made any determination that
it had been made voluntarily and with an understanding of the
nature of the allegations.28
Moreover, a confession which is obtained as the result of prom-
ises is invalid. Thus, when a juvenile confesses as the result of the
policeman promising that he would not be prosecuted for other of-
fenses, the confession is invalid. 90
C. Speedy Trial Rule
When a juvenile is arrested and the juvenile court decides to
waive jurisdiction in order that the accused may be tried as an
adult, he must be tried within 180 days of his arrest or be discharged
285. State v. Williams, 304 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
286. T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
287. Husk v. State, 305 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
288. R16berts v. State, 285 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
289. G.M.K. v. State, 312 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
290. M.D.B. v. State, 311 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
under the speedy trial rule; 9' the time begins to run from the arrest
and not from the time that jurisdiction is waived. '
A congested trial calendar resulting from an overworked judge
is not an exceptional circumstance which excuses the failure to try
a juvenile within 90 days as provided for in Rule 8.120, Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure and 3.191(f) Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and, as a result, the delinquency charges must be dis-
missed.23
D. Legislation
Juvenile traffic offenses have been defined as violations, by a
child, of a state or local ordinance governing the use of motor vehi-
cles with the following exceptions: (a) fleeing a police officer, (b)
leaving the scene of an accident which involves death or personal
injuries, or (c) driving while under the influence of alcohol, narcotic
drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants. '94
The "Interstate Compact on Placement of Children" has been
enacted to provide that children may be sent to or received for
placement from states which join the compact. Placement is defined
as the arranging for the care of a child in a "family free or boarding
home or in a child-caring agency or institution," '95 and placement
can include delinquent as well as dependent children.
Section 39.26 of the Florida Statues was amended to provide for
the Governor of Florida to enter into an "out-of-state confinement
compact" with other states to provide for the confinement of juve-
nile probationers, parolees, escapees and abscondees between the
various states which enter into this compact. 9 '
Child care facilities (which would seem to include primarily
non-public or church-related day care nurseries which do not come
within the ambit of chapter 232 of the Florida Statutes) must now
be licensed and comply with standards set by the Child Care Advi-
sory Council of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv-
ices. 9'
Courts which have jurisdiction over traffic offenses now have
291. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.19(a)(1).
292. Benton v. State, 307 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); accord, Boatman v. State, 306
So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
293. State v. In re J.H., 295 So. 2d 698 (FIa. 1st Dist. 1974).
294. FLA. STAT. § 316.045 (Supp. 1974).
295. FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (Supp. 1974).
296. FLA. STAT. § 39.26 (Supp. 1974).
297. FLA. STAT. § 402.305 (Supp. 1974).
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jurisdiction over any juvenile who does not hold a driver's license
and who is charged with a non-criminal infraction.298
Section 39.03(2) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to
provide that juveniles who are taken into custody may now be re-
leased into the custody of an adult (who is not related to the juve-
nile) approved by the court at a prior time as an authorized agent
of the department to receive children for temporary placement. The
court is required to review this placement within forty-eight hours,
excluding Sundays and legal holidays.
299
The child abuse laws were amended to provide (among other
things) that the phrases "child abuse" or "maltreatment" include
the concept of "sexual abuse." Also included is a provision that,
although parents may not be guilty of child abuse if they withhold
medical treatment because of their religious beliefs, this does not
prevent a court from ordering medical treatment for a child,'" by a
practioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing in accord-
ance with the tenets and practices of a well recognized church or
religious organization.
The child abuse statutes were amended to provide that any
person who willfully or knowingly makes public or discloses any
information contained in the child abuse registry or records may be
held personally liable for damages to any person injured or ag-
grieved.30I
Section 828.03 of the Florida Statutes, which provided that
societies for the prevention of cruelty to children could appoint
agents for the purpose of prosecuting those accused of cruelty to
children, has been amended to provide that now the agents have
only the power to investigate rather than prosecute.
30 2
The child labor laws have been extensively amended and the
central theme seems to be a lowering of minimum ages for employ-
ment.
0 3
The Department of Education has been statutorily directed to
establish 18 regional diagnostic and resource centers for exceptional
students in 18 different Florida counties.
3 4
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was ex-
298. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-183, amending FLA. STAT. § 316.045(2), (Supp. 1974).
299. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-198, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.03(2) (1973).
300. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-185, amending FLA. STAT. § 827.07 (Supp. 1974).
301. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-101, amending FLA. STAT. § 827.07(11) (Supp. 1974).
302. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-223, amending FLA. STAT. § 823.03 (1973).
303. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-195, amending FLA. STAT. § 450.11, 450.021, 232.07, 450.061,
450.081, 450.11, 460.151, 450.161 & 232.08 (1973).
304. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-69, amending FLA. STAT. § 229.832 (Supp. 1974).
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tensively reorganized and in the process the term "child in need of
supervision" was deleted from the statutes; runaway children and
truant children were included within the definition of dependent
children; a definition of an "ungovernable child" was added;
procedures were added for detention hearings with regard to chil-
dren who have been twice adjudicated to be delinquent and who are
charged with a third act of delinquency which involves a felony, etc.
Space limitations do not permit any detailed discussion of this
lengthy act.""
Section 39.11 of the Florida Statutes was amended to state that
courts may now order the natural parents or legal guardian of a child
adjudicated dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision to par-
ticipate in family counselling and other professional counselling ac-
tivities deemed necessary for the rehabilitation of the child. 0
Any court having jurisdiction over a delinquent child now has
the power to order the child to make restitution for the damage or
loss caused by his offense "in a reasonable amount or manner to be
determined by the court. The court may require the clerk of the
circuit court to be the receiving and dispensing agent."3 07 Query:
Does this statute prevent an injured person from suing the child in
a civil action? Does this statute take away the injured person's right
of trial by jury in an action against the child? Did the draftsmen





A court lacks guardianship jurisdiction over a minor who is not
domiciled in, or a resident of, the state and who was present in the
state for only a brief period while he was hospitalized as the result
of an airplane crash.30"
A committing judge in an incompetency proceeding has the
power to discharge the alleged incompetent without appointing an
examining committee, and this is especially true when he discovers
that the proceeding was instituted by a disgruntled ex-boyfriend for
malicious purposes.'"'
305. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-48, amending FLA. STAT. § 20.04(3) (Supp. 1974).
306. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-114, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.11(8) (Supp. 1974).
307. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-135, creating FLA. STAT. § 39.11(3)(f) (Supp. 1974).
308. Junco v. Suarez-Solis, 294 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
309. Meredity v. McNeal, 308 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
(Vol. XXX
FAMILY LAW
A trial court has jurisdiction to enter an order authorizing
guardians of the person to take such steps as they believe appropri-
ate and necessary to prevent certain persons from communicating
with an incompetent or entering his apartment. t 0 It is interesting
to speculate as to what the guardians could do to "take such steps"
to prevent persons (who have not been enjoined) from doing these
acts.
A court does have the power to commit persons to the custody
of the Division of Retardation of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, but the court does not have the power to
dictate the kind of treatment or to supervise the treatment and
placement of these persons.3 '
When an order of incompetency was entered without notice to
the alleged incompetent or his brother who had custody of the al-
leged incompetent, and the only notice which was given was to the
alleged incompetent's former attorney who had advised the court
that he no longer represented him, the order of incompetency was
set aside. The case was remanded to the trial court for an entry of
an order under Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
which will provide the alleged incompetent with an avenue for di-
rect appeal of the order."1 2
2. VENUE
The proper venue for guardianship proceedings is in the county
in which the incompetent has been a resident, and when a court has
taken jurisdiction over his person and property, a court of another
county should not attempt to assume jurisdiction because the pro-
per venue remains with the original county.313
3. LIENS FOR CARE
When the state of Florida institutes guardianship proceedings
involving an incompetent who is placed in a state mental hospital,
and who is subsequently transferred to a private nursing home at
the request of the state which was directed by the court to select the
home, effect the ward's transfer, and "secure and guarantee pay-
ment" ' for her care, and the nursing home relied upon these acts
310. In re McIntosh, 296 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
311. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. Div. of Retardation v. Owens, 305
So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
312. Smith v. Garst, 289 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
313. Benedict v. Foster, 300 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1974).
314. In re Irving, 297 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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of the state and rendered services to the ward, the state is estopped
to claim a lien against the ward's assets for hospital services ren-
dered when the private nursing home also is claiming compensation
and the ward's assets are insufficient to pay both claimants.
B. Legislation
Mental Health Boards are now required to have at least one
physician or psychiatrist as a member."'
The Florida Gifts to Minors Act was amended to add credit
unions to the list of financial enterprises in which minors may have
an interest as the result of gifts." 6
The guardianship laws were extensively amended to provide
(among other things) that the guardian must honor an adult ward's
reasonable preferences as to the ward's place of domicile and stan-
dard of living; that the court is to give consideration to the ward's
preferences in the appointment of a guardian; that bond may be
waived in voluntary guardianship proceedings and that the guard-
ian may now dissent from a will or exercise any other choice that
the ward might exercise without court order. Space limitations pre-
clude a complete analysis of these amendments." 7
XII. ILLEGITIMACY
A. Generally
In a paternity action, jurisdiction cannot be acquired by con-
structive service by publication on the defendant."8
An insurance policy which contains an acknowledgement by
the insured in the presence of a competent witness that the insured
is the father of children, is a sufficient acknowledgement under
section 731.29(1) of the Florida Statutes to constitute the illegiti-
mate children heirs of their father.
3 19
When a notary public testifies that a signature and a notary
public seal on an affidavit are his, but that he cannot recall the
details which occurred 24 years previously as to the execution of the
affidavit by a man stating that he was the father of an illegitimate
315. FLA. STAT. § 394.70(1)(c) (Supp. 1974).
316. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-142, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 710.02, 710.03(1)(c), 710.04(2),
710.05(7), & 710.07, (Supp. 1974).
317. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-222, amending FL.A. STAT. §§ 744.203, 744.312, 744.402,
744.501(2) (Supp. 1974).
318. Drucker v. Fernandez, 288 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
319. In re Hill, 294 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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child, nor can he testify that the man signing the affidavit was
actually the man he appeared to be, and there is no testimony
impeaching the signature of the affiant on the affidavit nor on a
birth certificate containing the same name, this is sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that a father has acknowledged his illegi-
timate child in writing in the presence of a competent witness.320
The case of Pinkney v. Pinkney"I which held that an illegiti-
mate child has no cause of action against her father for the wrongful
death of her mother and for having caused the daughter to be born
illegitimate, has been overruled."' The court has further held that
section 742.031 of the Florida Statutes may be construed as author-
izing a court to grant the same custody rights in illegitimate chil-
dren to the father as to the mother, and that, as so construed, is not
unconstitutional. It is apparent that the court went out of its way
to uphold the constitutionality of this section; it is submitted that
the statute was intended to exclude the father of an illegitimate
child which, of course, would have rendered it unconstitutional.
B. Legislation
The terms "illegitimate child," "bastard" and "bastardy" have
been eliminated from the Florida Statutes, and the words "child
born out of wedlock" have been substituted. Further, birth certifi-
cates will no longer make any reference to the legitimacy of chil-
dren .3
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Change of Names
Under section 62.031 of the Florida Statutes, a married woman
may have her birth name as her legal name during coverture "so
long as the statistical data required by the statute is given, as well
as a verification that the petition is not being filed for ulterior or
illegal purposes nor will the change of name invade the property
rights of others." '
320. Locke v. Campbell, 305 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
321. 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
322. Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1974).
323. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-166, amending FLA. STAT. § 382.17, 382.21(1), (2), and (4),
382.35(2), (3), (4), and (7)(d), 742.011, 742.091, 742.10, 744.301(1), 856.04(2), and the title of
ch. 742 (from "Bastardy" to "Determination of Paternity").
324. Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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B. Emancipation
A parent will not be liable for the cost of hospital services ren-
dered to his minor daughter when the facts show that she has been
emancipated as the result of her leaving home and becoming com-
pletely self-supporting. A common law emancipation may occur as
the result of the parties' actions even though there has not been any
compliance with the statutory means of securing emancipation
under section 62.011 of the Florida Statutes."5
C. Torts
Under maritime law, a spouse of a stevedore who is injured
aboard ship may not recover for loss of consortium regardless of the
sex of the stevedore.
326
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has, in light of
its position as an intermediate appellate court, followed the inter-
spousal tort immunity rule articulated by the Supreme Court of
Florida.
32 7
A wife does not have a cause of action against her husband or
ex-husband for compensatory and punitive damages on the grounds
that he induced her to marry him by false and fraudulent protesta-
tions of love, that he left her after days of marriage, and that he told
her to leave the marital home, harassing and threatening her with
physical injury.
32 1
A father cannot maintain a derivative action against his une-
mancipated son and his insurance company for loss of services and
medical expenses caused as a result of injuries incurred by another
unemancipated son.329
A claim by a wife against her husband's paramour for invasion
of her privacy by wrecking and destroying her marriage is, in reality,
a suit for alienation of affections which is forbidden by section
771.01 of the Florida Statutes.1
3
In De Guido v. De Guido,33' a wife who was a passenger in a car
sued her husband for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result
325. Ison v. Florida Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 302 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
326. Davidson v. Schlussel Reederei KG, 295 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
327. Heaton v. Heaton, 304 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), following Bencomo v.
Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Gasten v. Pittman, 224
So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969); accord, Doyle v. Doyle, 307 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
328. Mims v. Mims, 305 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
329. Wright v. Farmers Reliance Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
330. De La Portilla v. De La Portilla, 287 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied
295 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1974).
331. 308 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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of his negligent driving. Five months after filing his answer the
defendant raised the defense of interspousal immunity for the first
time and moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The trial court
granted the motion, but the appellate court reversed and held that
matters outside the pleadings cannot be raised by a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Further, unless the defendant can show
that this defense was unavailable at the time of the filing of the
answer, he cannot raise it now as it was waived.
In an action for wrongful death the defendant may not plead
insanity as a defense when the claim is limited to compensatory
damages; the result may, however, be different when punitive dam-
ages are also sought."'
In a case whose implications may be far reaching, the First
District Court of Appeal has held that a municipality may be held
liable for the negligence of its employees (primarily policemen) who,
after repeatedly having answered complaints about a father's be-
havior, and having seen some of the injuries inflicted upon the chil-
dren, failed to protect them from his abuse. 33
332. Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied 309 So. 2d 7 (Fla.
1975).
333. Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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